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Aristotle, Phenomenology, and the Mind/Body Problem 
Valeria Bizzari 
University of Pisa 
Abstract. The mind-body relationship is a fundamental issue that has interested 
philosophers from very different schools of thought. Nowadays we can observe several 
positions being taken on this topic — my aim is to emphasize the phenomenological 
perspective on the mind-body relationship and, in particular, the role of Aristotelian 
thought in the contributions of philosophers such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. This 
paper consists of three different parts: in the first part, I will briefly sketch out 
a phenomenological account of the living body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty; in second 
part, I will try to find parallels between phenomenology and Aristotle’s philosophy. 
Finally, I will argue for an Aristotelian reading of schizophrenia, a pathology that seems 
to be caused by a disruption of the corporeal Self. 
1.Husserl and Merleau- Ponty: the centrality of the lived body 
One of the main achievements of the phenomenological method is 
undoubtedly that of revealing the intentional bond that connects the subject 
and the world: in other words, thanks to the concept of intentionality, Husserl 
seems to succeed in the attempt to explain the experience of the world in all 
its concreteness. 
At first sight, this statement may sound like a paradox: the very act that 
“puts in brackets” the elements that fall under the label of „facticity” is the 
one that reveals the true essence of things. For this reason, it is possible to 
argue that the Husserlian subject has a constitutive role towards the world, 
and everything is related to it. This thesis is neither an idealistic argument — 
which would consider the person confined in a solipsistic position that 
transcends reality — nor a realistic one; rather, it tends to exceed both 
orientations in favor of a correlation between the world and consciousness 
that, as such, is unique and concrete: in other words, a temporal, 
intersubjective and embodied consciousness. 
In contrast to a „dichotomous” vision of the Husserlian production and an 
approach that considers the body a prominent theme only in the „late” 
Husserl, as well as in opposition to an idealistic absolutist view, which 
assumes the Husserlian subject is a pure entity made up of synthetic 
capacities and which is only contingently related to the body, it seems to me 
that we can affirm not only the presence of the concept of „living body” in 
most of the production of the Master but also the centrality that this concept 
assumes for the most important aspects of the life of consciousness. 
8           Valeria Bizzari 
 
In fact, self-affection, which appears as reducible to the self-manifestation 
of subjectivity, is linked to two main functions: temporality—which provides 
the formal structure to the pre-reflective self-awareness, enabling the 
experience of my own lived acts as a unity made up of retentions, protections 
and living present— and the embodiment. In other words, perception implies 
a lived body as an orientation center provided with kinesthetic sensations. 
For instance, when I see or touch the surface of an object, I also co-perceive 
it through the kinesthetic sensations of the movements of my fingers. This is 
referring to an implicit self-awareness of my own body and of my own motor 
possibilities. 
Being a lived body allows not only for self-consciousness, but also for the 
experience of the alterity. Firstly, because others are implied in my perceptual 
horizon before a concrete face-to-face encounter: perception is never 
exhausted in the short term, but is an original reference structure for potential 
and anonymous co-perceivers. Since this implicit co-perceiver is 
characterized by perception capabilities, he is necessarily embodied. 
Furthermore, through the Leib, otherness is constituted as a new form of 
reality recognized as analogous thanks to the similarities between my body 
and that of others. Being embodied is essential: only through the Leib can I, 
in fact, enter into the field of perception of the other, which, in turn, 
recognizes me as Leibanalogon, a corporeality which finds its expression in 
an individuality. 
The centrality of the living body is also present in the work of another 
important phenomenologist: Merleau-Ponty. The relevance that Husserl’s 
thought had in the development of his philosophy emerges clearly in the 
preface to Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau-Ponty, 1945), his second 
doctoral thesis published in 1945, where the reference to the German 
phenomenologist is constant. The purpose of the text is the ontological 
rehabilitation of perception and of a corporeality conceived as a perceptual 
consciousness intentioning the world before any logical and representative 
operations. 
Regarding specifically the theme of the body, it becomes clear how the 
Husserlian description of corporeality is the necessary starting point for the 
French phenomenologist: Husserl, in fact, stressed the importance of the 
mobility of the body, so necessary that there can be no perception without it, 
and emphasized the duality of the body in the subject’s ontology (s/he is 
a material object, but also a living corporeity) and the consequent 
reversibility(consider, for example, the phenomenon of bilateralism of 
kinesthesia, where the subject is both „perceiver” and „touched”). Merleau-
Ponty develops these themes, especially those concerning the essential 
involvement of the subject in the world: according to this view, which 
emerges already in Husserl’s recent works, every experience is embodied, 
and the body appears as the middle term between Subjectivity and 
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Objectivity, irreducible to one or the other dimension because it is 
ontologically and essentially twofold. The question of the „primacy of 
perception,” the main theme of Merleau-Pontian philosophy, is entirely 
derived from the philosophy of Husserl, who — especially during the course 
„The basic problems of Phenomenology,” held in Göttingen from 1910 to 
1911 — described sensory perception as a body issue because not only is 
perception itself intended as a purely physical talent, but the body itself is the 
„subject of perception.” Merleau-Ponty develops such theses and describes 
the body as the epistemological foundation of knowledge. 
In this view, it seems to be possible to speak of the existence of 
a „phenomenology of the body” where the perceiver is a concrete subject, 
a living body, and understanding the role of the living body makes it possible 
to realize the essential complexity of existence. 
2. Aristotle and the mind/body problem 
Despite the fact that ancient philosophy seems to be strongly convinced of 
the separation between the mind and the body1 (conceiving the mind as soul, 
as the spiritual substratum of the person), Aristotle represents an exception, 
and his interpretation of the link between the soul and its corporeal life is 
a source of complex and varying theories. On the one hand, there is the 
essential conception of the mind/body link,2 according to which the soul is 
the essence of the body; on the other hand, instrumental and functionalist 
views consider the link between the soul and the body to be non-essential,3 
because the body is a mere instrument or function. 
According to my proposal, Aristotle’s ontology of the body looks very 
similar to the phenomenological one, because he emphasizes the role of the 
body both in perception and in the definition of the subject, who seems to be 
a “living corporeity.” Both phenomenology and Aristotelian philosophy, 
through the concept of Leib and the notion of soma empsiuchon respectively, 
led to the overcoming of a dualistic vision of the living being. But how did 
Aristotle face the mind/body problem? 
                                               
1 The separation between the mind and the body has been theorized upon since 
Homer, who put emphasis on the role that the soul — understood as a mere transcendent 
principle — had in defining the individual. Plato, in particular, set this trend by conceiv-
ing the soul as the principle of life, which is not only separated from the body, but, since 
it is immortal, detaches completely from the latter after its death. This approach has had 
remarkable fortune within the Christian tradition, favoring the emergence of a dualistic 
vision which found fertile ground both in the Middle Ages (for instance, in Thomas Aqui-
nas’ theory, according to which the soul has no need for the body) and in the modern era. 
2 Cfr., for instance, F. Nuyens (1948), D. Ross (1924). 
3 We can recall A. Bos and S. Menn among the instrumentalists, and Martha C. Nuss-
baum among the functionalists. Another position is a mere dualism, claimed, for instance, 
by R. Heinaman (see Heinaman, 1990). 
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In order to answer this question, I will mainly take into account the texts 
of De Anima, Parva Naturalia, and Metaphysics (book Z), and I will claim 
that in Aristotle’s philosophy there is an essential link between the body and 
the soul, the same link that we can find in the phenomenological perspective. 
Especially in Book II of De Anima, Aristotle reflects upon the ontological 
value of the soul. The psiuchè is described as the constitutive principle of the 
body: our soul cannot exist separately from the body (contrary to what Plato 
argued); rather, they are two unified elements which give rise to the living 
reality. To quote Aristotle himself: “the soul is not a body but requires a body; 
for it is not a body, but it belongs to a body, and for that reason it is present 
in a body, and in this sort of body” (414a20).4 
In this view, the mind-body problem could be solved by linking the living 
body (the Leib, in phenomenological terms) to the psyche. The notion of Leib 
may find a parallel in the Aristotelian hylomorphic theory, which argues for 
the inextricable relation between our psychic capacities and the organic 
stratum (sinolus). Both the Leib and the soma empsiucon have the task of 
connecting the psychic functions with a material substrate, according to 
a gestaltic vision of reality, an òlon, where the different components take part 
in the whole. This does not mean arguing for a psychological materialism: 
both in Aristotle’s philosophy and in phenomenology, the immateriality of 
the soul and its necessary link with the body stand together. In the first case, 
hylomorphism claims the inextricability between the soul and the body which 
it makes alive; in phenomenology, the notion of Leib is synonymous with the 
double ontology of the body, which is material and psychic, object and 
subject. The notions of Leib and that of sinolus (an entity composed of soul 
and body) are consistent with the thesis according to which the body allows 
the “actualization” of life. Following this perspective, we can argue that in 
Aristotle’s philosophy we can find a vision of the living being as a biological 
unity, where the soul fulfills a large number of its functions through the body. 
According to Aristotle, the form realizes its own ergon precisely because it 
is an embodied principle, inextricably entangled in matter. The formal 
principle (eidos) linked to the organic substance ensures either the specificity 
of the sensible substance or the universality of the species to which it belongs. 
Husserl’s philosophy seems to be coherent with hylomorphism, especially 
in the late works of the father of phenomenology, where he underlines the 
existence of an essentially psychophysical subject. In Ideas II, in the chapter 
devoted to the analysis of the process of empathy, we can find 
an explicit reference to De Anima. As argued by Aristotle, according to 
Husserl the psyche is moving with the living body because they are 
constantly entangled. Husserl uses an Aristotelian passage in order to explain 
                                               
4 The translation is mine, from the Italian edition of the second book of De Anima, 
translated into Italian by Giovanna R. Giardina. 
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the importance of movement in the intersubjective understanding: as 
the living body is a psycho-physical being characterized by a sensory-motor 
structure, so the sinolus is a sensible substance equipped with an internal 
motor principle. According to Husserl, seeing a moving body allows for the 
analogical argument and, subsequently, the recognition of a psycho-physical 
subjectivity, a Leib like me. In this perspective, the intersubjective process is 
also embodied. 
Another similarity between Aristotle’s doctrine and phenomenology is 
the importance given to touch. This specific sense is considered to be deeply 
important: according to Husserl; the tactile sensations of localization (which 
we can observe, for instance, in the phenomenon of bilaterality of 
kinesthesia) are the fundamental factor that leads to the synthetic constitution 
of the lived body, allowing subjective awareness. Although in different ways, 
the role of touch is emphasized also in Aristotle: this sense in considered the 
ground for all the others, and it is identified with the nourishment faculty, as 
if even intelligence would depend upon sensitivity. On this view, perception 
seems to be the ground for intellectual apprehension: the science of soul is in 
continuity with biological and physical inquiries, because there is a strong 
link between intellectual activity and corporeity. 
Either in phenomenology (especially in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, whose 
emphasis on the role of the body is stronger than in Husserl’s thought) or in 
Aristotle’s philosophy, corporeity is revalued epistemologically and 
ontologically. From an epistemological point of view, in the Metaphysics and 
in the Posterior Analytics, the descriptions of sensorial activity (intended as 
esthesis, simple sensation, and as empeiria, empirical experience) are 
consistent with attributing a gnoseological value to sensitivity, which seems 
to be the ground for more complex intellectual activities (like imagination or 
memory). In the same way, Husserl underlined the importance of kinesthesia 
and of passive synthesis, and Merleau- Ponty argued for “the primacy of 
perception”; in both authors, the relationship between the subject and the 
world seems to resolve itself in a tangle of cognition and action. From this 
point of view, the world is always perceived from a specific perspective of 
which my living body is the center. Therefore, objects have a specific 
meaning depending on the potentialities of action of the subject, which have 
been intuitively grasped and are not the result of inferential processes. This 
phenomenological thesis seems to be an echo of Aristotle’s philosophy, also 
in emphasizing the importance of movement:5 we must remember, in fact, 
that the Stagirite affirmed: “We must therefore see that we under- stand what 
                                               
5 Nowadays, Aristotle is used as a reference by some phenomenologists who strongly 
emphasize the role of bodily movement in perception and cognition (a paradigmatic case 
is Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (see, for instance, Sheets-Johnstone (2011)). 
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motion is; for if it were unknown, nature too would be unknown.” (Aristotle, 
Physics 200b12-14)6 
From an ontological perspective, while in phenomenology we can talk 
about a Leib, an embodied subjectivity linked with the world in 
a pre-reflexive and intentional manner, in Aristotle the soma empsiucon is 
the result of the indissoluble union between psyche and matter, and the soul 
itself seems to be (as we can notice in De Anima) “the first act of a natural 
body with the capacity for life” (412a27, my translation from Italian). 
A concrete example of the entanglement between the mind and the body 
is represented by the description of the dreamlike experience in De Somno: 
while, on the one hand, Aristotle claims that during this process the subject 
can make up for those elements which are latent when he/she is awake 
(bringing forward Freud’s intuition), on the other hand he gives us 
a detailed account of dreams as psycho-physical phenomena which imply 
anatomical and physiological processes. For instance, he describes the dream 
as an experience that depends on the condition of the heart, of the sensorial 
organs, even on the pureness of the bloodstream. It is very interesting to 
notice that neuroscientific discoveries have confirmed, in a certain sense, 
Aristotle’s intuition: in fact, nowadays we know that our hippocampus adopts 
different modes of operation when we are sleeping. We can then affirm that 
Aristotle (and later, phenomenology) seems to be right in conceiving 
the subject as ontologically and epistemologically bound with corporeity. 
But what are the consequences of a similar (embodied) approach in the 
contemporary debate? I will try to answer to this question in the next section, 
where, using Aristotelian and phenomenological vocabulary, I will focus on 
a case study of (disrupted) perception. 
3. Aristotle and the role of the body in perception: a case study 
We can practically observe this embodied perspective “at work” in 
the analysis of perception, especially in those cases where perception is 
disrupted. In fact, it is precisely on these occasions that the body reveals its 
importance. In phenomenological psychopathology, there is a strong 
tendency to consider corporeal awareness to be the very ground of synthetic 
capabilities and consciousness activities.7 In fact, our perception and our 
“being in the world” are usually permeated by a bodily sense of Self: recent 
empirical studies have shown that this corporeal feeling is present from the 
                                               
6 Barnes (1984). 
7  See, in particular, the works by Stanghellini (especially 2006) Fuchs (2005) 
and Fuchs, Schlimme (2009). 
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first years of our life, like a primordial “sensus communis” that is the ground 
for abilities like proprioception, perception, and emotion.8 
The definition of common sense (or koinè aisthesis) is provided by 
Aristotle, who claims: “Besides the specific sense there is the sensus 
communis, which is not a sixth sense but a generic power of sensation as such 
which provides unity for the sensitive soul in its particular manifestations. 
The ear does not see; however, the man who hears also sees, and some 
qualities are presented through more than one sense…We also perceive that 
we are perceiving through sensus communis.”9 
My thesis is that koinè aisthesis is an embodied act: in fact, providing 
unity for the sensitive soul seems to be an activity very similar to the 
Husserlian passive synthesis, where corporeity plays a fundamental role. 
Common sense allows the subject to combine the different sensorial 
modalities, associating each sensation with a form of self-awareness. As 
a confirmation, in Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle affirms that the awareness 
of perception itself means the existence of perception. For this reason, we 
can say that self-awareness is sensorial and embodied. In the same way, we 
have seen how in Husserlian philosophy there is a pre-reflexive, passive, 
and anonymous self-consciousness, antecedent to any synthetic activity 
and presupposing a lived body which works as an orientation center. In fact, 
kinesthetic sensations make us aware of our sensations and movements 
immediately and intuitively, in a sort of primary self-consciousness. 
In schizophrenic subjects we can register a progressive alienation from 
their own bodily feeling. The disembodiment of the self is often the culprit 
of the loss of perceptual and cognitive capacities: in this perspective, our 
lived body could be considered the core of our tacit and pre-reflective 
understanding of the environment, while its loss necessarily seems to involve 
a loss in the sphere of koinè aisthesis. 
Furthermore, as G. Stanghellini noticed (2004), the supramodal 
perception described by the Stagirite, i.e. the pre-reflexive and pre-
conceptual sensorial synthesis, seems also to be the ground for the 
understanding of alterity. In other words, intersubjectivity can be defined in 
the same way as intercorporeity, as a process based on the immediate transfer 
of corporeal schema. The consequence is that, if the embodied being of a 
subject is compromised, his self-consciousness and his ability to find 
attunement with the other and the world will be lost or disrupted. 
                                               
8 I mean, for instance, the studies by Meltzoff and Moore (Meltzoff, Moore, 1977; 
or Moll, Meltzoff, 2010). According to Meltzoff, a corporeal attunenement is the consti-
tutive ground for social understanding, from its first step (sharing perspective) to the more 
complex level of understanding. In other words, our pre-reflective and corporeal sense of 
self is immediately linked to intersubjectivity and it allows us to have both proprioception 
and the perception of alterity. 
9 Edward (1967, p.3). 
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Social and corporeal selves seem to share the same roots, constituted by 
the sensory-motor integration given by koinè aisthesis. In the case of 
schizophrenia, the importance of similar grounding is very clear: in fact, the 
subject is affected by kinesthetic disorders. The senses are perceived as 
fragmented, and the subject experiences a disruption of self-awareness, 
which is one of the main symptoms preceding the detachment of the self from 
intersubjective world. 
As I have previously noted (in the first section), in Husserlian philosophy 
the subject is intentionally linked to the world through his kinesthetic 
capabilities, originarily connected to his living corporeity. In the same way, 
it is possible to claim that the sensory-motor organization described by 
Aristotle is the necessary condition for an adequate perception of alterity. The 
sensorial coordination at the base of this mechanism is the same structure that 
is disrupted in the schizophrenic experience, especially in the first stages of 
development of this pathology: in fact, we can register abnormal bodily 
sensations which cause disorders in the intercorporal attunement process at 
the root of intersubjectivity. What emerges is the particular importance of 
a sensorial and kinesthetic consciousness, which seems to be consistent both 
with Aristotle’s thought and a phenomenological analysis. 
Conclusion 
In both phenomenology and Aristotle’s philosophy, the role of the corporeal 
structure of self seems to be fundamental: it is necessary in order to 
understand the world and in order to have social attunement. More 
specifically, the link between the mind and the body comes to light in 
Aristotle’s analysis of perception, where we can find the gnoseological value 
of sensation that looks to be coherent with a “phenomenology of 
embodiment.” The mind and the body, form and matter, give rise to 
a biological unity: on this view, the mind/body problem seems to be solved, 
or we can even say that it is a relationship which does not need to be 
considered a problem at all. We can simply argue that the soul is form and 
the body is matter. Since they constitute a sinolus, mind and body, soul and 
matter cannot be separated. In the same way, from a phenomenological 
perspective, Leib and Körper are synonymous with the double ontology of 
the person, which is an embodied consciousness. To put it more 
appropriately: “Hence we need not ask whether the soul and body are one, 
any more than we need to ask this about the wax and the seal or, in general, 
about the matter and the thing of which it is the matter. For while one and 
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being one are spoken of in several ways, the actuality <and what it 
actualizes> are fully one.”10 
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Abstract. David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory 
of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’. Lewis’ critics generally accept that his argument is 
sound and focus instead on trying to show that its implications are less severe than 
appearances suggest. In this paper I argue that Lewis’ argument is unsound. I show that 
it rests on an essential assumption that can be straightforwardly proven false using ideas 
and principles to which Lewis is himself committed. 
1. Introduction 
David Lewis (Lewis, 1988, 1996) describes, then attempts to refute, an anti-
Humean theory of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’ (DAB). I will call 
Lewis’ argument against DAB the ‘updating argument’. The implications of 
the updating argument are often held to extend far beyond disputes over the 
nature of desire. For example, Graham Oddie says it constitutes ‘a massive 
problem for realism about value’ (Oddie, 1994, p. 453), while Ruth 
Weintraub says it ‘entails subjectivism about ethics’ (Weintraub, 2007, 
p. 119). 
In this paper I show that the updating argument rests on an essential 
assumption that can be straightforwardly proven false using ideas 
and principles to which Lewis is explicitly committed and which are central 
to the updating argument itself. My position, in other words, is that in 
constructing the updating argument Lewis implicitly contradicts himself. 
The error I identify in the updating argument appears to have gone 
unnoticed by the updating argument’s many other critics. These critics have, 
with a few exceptions, accepted the updating argument as sound, 
and focused instead on trying to show that its soundness can be tolerated. 
A common tack has been to contend that DAB is not in any case a plausible 
or attractive (or even, perhaps, coherent) version of anti-Humeanism, 
and then argue (or at least suggest) that certain more plausible versions of 
anti-Humeanism are invulnerable to the updating argument (Broome, 1991; 
Byrne & Hájek, 1997; Daskal, 2010; Hájek & Pettit, 2004; Price, 1989; 
Weintraub, 2007). This approach has the weakness that, while it might 
provide comfort to the anti-Humean, it does nothing to dispel the threats 
posed by the updating argument to value-realism and objectivism in ethics. 
The present paper disposes of all such threats. 
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§2 describes DAB. §3 outlines the updating argument. §4 exposes the 
error in the updating argument. §5 deals with possible Lewisian rejoinders. 
§6 wraps things up. 
2. DAB 
Following Lewis (Lewis, 1988, 1996), let ‘A’ (pronounced ‘A halo’) 
denote the claim that A’s being true is good. Harmlessly simplifying 
(although c.f. (Oddie, 2001)), Lewis ignores degrees of goodness, and in 
the interests of generality he doesn’t specify what A’s being good consists 
in (instead leaving one free to plug in whichever analysis of goodness one 
wants). Let V(A) denote the degree to which a rational agent values A being 
the case. Let C(p) denote a rational agent’s credence for p’s being true. 
DAB is the following claim:  
DAB:   V(A)=C(A) 
That is, DAB is simply the idea that the value assigned by a rational agent 
to some proposition A, and thus the extent to which she desires that A, is 
identical to her credence for A being good.1 DAB is ‘anti-Humean’ in the 
sense that it entails a rational agent’s desires logically supervene on her 
beliefs about what is good: i.e., that her desires and beliefs are not modally 
separable ‘distinct existences’. 
In the above formula, A is intended by Lewis to be a universally 
quantified variable ranging over all propositions. Following Lewis, I leave 
this implicit, omitting the quantifier. For simplicity I continue to suppress 
quantifiers until near the end of the paper. 
3. Lewis’ updating argument  
The updating argument (Lewis, 1988, 1996) involves the following two 
claims: 
INV:  V(A|A)=V(A) 
X:   V(A|A)=C(A|A) 
INV says, in effect, that the value a rational agent assigns to a proposition, 
A, being true will not be affected by her learning that A is indeed true. 
Lewis provides a detailed argument for INV (Lewis, 1988, pp. 331-332). 
Recently, several authors have argued that INV is false (Bradley & List, 
                                               
1 Although DAB is intended as a theory of desire, Lewis casts it in terms of the V 
operator, and thus in terms of what the agent values. His tacit assumption is that an 
agent desires a given state of affairs just to the degree she values it. If this assumption 
appears dubious then it can simply be stipulated that V(A) denotes strength of desire, 
rather than level of valuing. 
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2009; Bradley & Stefánsson, 2016; Stefánsson, 2014). But here I will 
assume that INV is true, and show that there is a problem elsewhere in 
Lewis’ argument. 
X is clearly a claim that a proponent of DAB must accept: for if 
a rational agent has learnt that A obtains, then her credence for A being 
good, and thus — according to DAB — the degree to which she values A, 
will be updated by conditionalization on A. This is what X says. 
DAB, INV and X together entail IND: 
IND:  C(A|A)=C(A) 
Thus, a proponent of DAB must accept IND. However, suppose an agent’s 
credence function is as depicted in the Venn diagram of Figure 1 (Lewis, 
1996, p. 309). 
 
Figure 1. An agent’s credence function for A, A and their negations. 
Suppose that the agent learns (say) that (AA) is the case, and updates her 
credences accordingly. Let’s call her updated credence function, C. By the 
rules of Bayesian updating, C is obtained by taking the credence 
represented by the shaded region of Figure 1 and redistributing it to 
the remaining regions so as to leave the relative sizes of these remaining 
regions unchanged. When this is done the A-region grows in size. Thus 
C(A)>C(A). On the other hand, the proportion of the A-region which 
overlaps with the A-region doesn’t change. Thus C(A|A)=C(A|A). When 
these two results are combined with the assumption that C satisfies IND, we 
get: 
C(A|A)=C(A|A)=C(A)<C(A), 
and thus, 
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C(A|A)<C(A). 
Notice that this means the agent’s updated credence function, C, does not 
conform to IND. And so even if an agent starts off using a credence 
function which satisfies IND, this property — of satisfying IND — will be 
unstable under Bayesian updating. It will, for instance, be lost as soon as 
the agent learns that (AA) is the case and updates her credences 
accordingly. A proponent of DAB must — Lewis says — therefore deny 
that credences are to be adjusted by Bayesian updating. However Lewis 
insists, reasonably enough, that given the choice of repudiating DAB or 
repudiating Bayesian updating, we should repudiate the former, not 
the latter (Lewis, 1988, p. 325). 
4. The error in Lewis’ reasoning 
My refutation of Lewis’ updating argument has two steps. First, I prove that 
a result I call the ‘conditionalization conjecture’ (CC) must be true if DAB 
is true. Next I show that if CC is true, then Lewis’ updating argument is 
unsound. 
Suppose that AA° is true — which is to say that A is true, and that A is 
good. Then it follows, obviously, that a good state of affairs obtains. Let 
this proposition, that a good state of affairs obtains, be called H (for ‘halo’). 
This being so, H says it would be good that a good state of affairs obtains, 
which is a trivial truth. On the other hand, (H) says it would be good that 
a good state of affairs does not obtain, which is a trivial falsehood. 
A rational agent will therefore assign a credence of 1 to H, and a credence 
of 0 to (H). These results are recorded as follows: 
C(H)=1      (1) 
C((H))=0      (2) 
If we assume DAB, then from (1) and (2) we can derive (3) and (4): 
V(H)=1      (3) 
V(H)=0      (4) 
According to Lewis (Lewis, 1988, p. 326, 1996, p. 303), the values 
assigned to outcomes by a rational agent will obey a principle of additivity, 
which he characterises as follows: ‘the value of a proposition that might 
come true in several alternative ways is an average of the values of those 
several alternatives, weighted by their conditional credences’ (Lewis, 1988, 
p. 326). In symbols: 
V(X)=i(V(XEi)C(Ei|X))     (5) 
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Here X denotes any given proposition, and {E1,…} denotes any given set of 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions (i.e., any ‘partition’ 
of possibility space). 
Now, let T represent some obvious tautology (say, ‘1=1’). Consider the 
partition {A, A}, where A is some arbitrary proposition. Substituting T for 
X and {A, A} for {E1, …} within (5) gives (6): 
V(T)=V(TA)C(A|T) + V(TA)C(A|T)   (6) 
When (6) is simplified in light of T being a tautology (and hence 
a necessary truth), it turns into (7): 
V(T)=V(A)C(A)+V(¬A)C(¬A)    (7) 
Now, let’s suppose the arbitrary selected proposition, A, that is mentioned 
in (7) is in fact identical to H. (7) then becomes (8): 
V(T)=V(H)C(H)+V(¬H)C(¬H)    (8) 
Substituting (3) and (4) into (8) yields (9): 
V(T)=C(H)     (9) 
Substituting (9) back into (7) gives us (10): 
C(H)=V(A)C(A)+V(¬A)C(¬A)   (9) 
Conditionalizing on A (and thus setting C(A)=1 and C(¬A)=0) we obtain 
(10): 
C(H|A)=V(A)      (10) 
Assuming again that DAB is true, we can derive CC from (10): 
CC:  C(A)=C(H|A) 
CC says that, for any proposition A, the credence that an agent assigns to A 
is identical to the conditional credence she assigns to there being a good 
outcome given that A comes true. Notice that CC implies that C(A) is not 
an unconditional credence (as surface appearances suggest), but that it is 
instead a disguised conditional credence – namely, the conditional credence 
of H given A. 
So much for why, if DAB is true, CC must be true. I now explain why, if 
CC is true, then Lewis’s updating argument against DAB rests on 
an illegitimate assumption. 
As already explained, the updating argument rests on the assumption 
that credences are distributed as in Figure 1, with one ‘dollop’ of credence 
being assigned to A, another, overlapping ‘dollop’ of credence being 
assigned to A, and the conditional credence assigned to (A|A) being 
represented by the proportion of the A-region which overlaps with the 
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A-region. If credences are distributed in this way, then Lewis is quite right: 
Bayesian updating can in this case potentially change how much credence is 
assigned to A without causing any corresponding change to how much 
conditional credence is assigned to (A|A) (or vice versa) – with the result 
that IND will not be robustly satisfied. 
However, if CC is true, then Figure 1 misrepresents the logical 
relationship between A and A. Whereas Figure 1 represents A and A as 
being logically independent propositions, CC implies that they are not 
independent, and that A is instead a conditional proposition, conditioned 
on A. If CC is true, then a rational agent’s credences must be distributed not 
as they are in Figure 1, but rather as they are in Figure 2: 
 
 
Figure 2. How credences should be assigned by a rational agent. 
In Figure 2 one ‘dollop’ of credence is assigned to H, and another to A. 
The amount of credence assigned to A, C(A), is identified with C(H|A), 
and thus with the proportion of A-region that overlaps with the H-region – 
or, that is, with the proportion of the shaded region that is crosshatched.  
Now, notice two points. First, under this way of allocating credences, 
C(A) is a conditional credence, and it is conditioned on A (for it is 
the conditional credence of H given A). Second, it is a universal rule that if 
a credence function is already conditioned on a certain outcome, then 
updating it by conditionalizing it on the same outcome again has no effect. 
(That is, for any two credence functions P and Q, if P(x)=Q(x|a) – i.e., if P 
is already conditioned on a – then P(x|a)=P(x) – i.e., conditionalizing P on 
a again changes nothing.) Putting these two points together, it follows that 
C(A|A)=C(A) (for, since A is already conditioned on A, conditioning on 
A again has no effect). Thus, it follows that C(A|A) will be represented in 
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Figure 2 in exactly the same way that C(A) is represented – namely, by 
the proportion of the shaded region that is crosshatched. Since C(A) 
and C(A|A) are, for this reason, necessarily identical, it is impossible for 
Bayesian updating to produce any mismatch between them. That is, not 
only are C(A) and C(A|A) both represented in Figure 2 by the proportion 
of the shaded region that is crosshatched, but they will both continue to be 
represented by this single element of the diagram even as the various 
regions in Figure 2 grow and shrink when forces of Bayesian updating are 
operating upon them. Since C(A) and C(A|A) must, for this reason, always 
be identical, IND will always be satisfied. 
Let’s take stock. Lewis’ updating argument against DAB allegedly 
proves that no credence function can robustly satisfy IND in the face of 
Bayesian updating. However, the updating argument assumes that 
credences are distributed as per Figure 1. I have shown that if DAB is true, 
then CC is true, and that if CC is true, then credences must instead be 
distributed as per Figure 2. Under this way of distributing credences, IND is 
necessarily satisfied. And so, in arguing against DAB, Lewis begs the 
question against DAB, by making an assumption that is inconsistent with 
the truth of DAB. The updating argument is unsound for this reason. 
5. How might Lewis respond? 
CC tells us that for any credence function, C, and proposition, A, 
C(A°)=C(H|A). The implication is that the halo function, A°, is 
a propositional function that accepts a proposition, p, as input, and produces 
another proposition, p°, as output, such that a rational agent’s credence for 
p° should always match her conditional credence for H, given p. But is 
a propositional function that meets these specifications even logically 
possible in the first place? We need look no further than some of David 
Lewis’s own earlier work in order to find an argument that purports to show 
that such a function is not logically possible.2 In his (Lewis, 1976, 1986) 
Lewis aims to demonstrate that there can be no systematic way of mapping 
a pair of propositions, q and r, onto a proposition, s, such that C(s) should 
match C(q|r). Lewis might respond to my demonstration that DAB entails 
CC by harking back to this earlier work. Specifically, he could argue that if 
DAB entails CC, then it follows from his earlier work that the halo function 
cannot exist, and thus that DAB is incoherent (because it posits the halo 
function). 
Although Lewis could respond in this way, there are two points to notice. 
First, although this would still give Lewis an argument against DAB, it 
                                               
2 Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing me to this work of Lewis. 
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would be a different argument than the one he in fact uses, the updating 
argument, which I have shown to be unsound. Second, it is controversial 
whether Lewis’ earlier results are correct (see, e.g., Edgington, 2014; Milne, 
1997). Hence, they provide an insecure foundation for a revised argument 
against DAB.3 
Another reply Lewis might make to my rebuttal of his updating 
argument can be guessed based on his response to a related argument by 
Huw Price. Price (1989) shows that Lewis’ updating argument can’t be 
used to refute the following anti-Humean rival to DAB, which Lewis 
(Lewis, 1996) calls ‘Desire as Conditional Belief’ (DACB): 
DACB:  V(A)=C(A|A) 
Lewis’ (1996) response to Price is rather involved. Here is my 
reconstruction of it. Lewis begins by, in effect, distinguishing two claims to 
which the Humean is committed: 
H1. Facts about what a rational agent desires are not fixed or determined by facts 
about what she believes.  
H2. Agents that are alike in being rational, that have the same priors, and that are 
privy to the same empirical data about the world, can potentially be unalike in what 
they value and desire. 
He then distinguishes two versions of anti-Humeanism, which I will call 
‘strong’ and ‘weak’. 4  The strong anti-Humean denies both H1 and H2, 
while the weak anti-Humean denies only H1. Lewis represents the strong 
anti-Humean’s claim as follows: 
DBN:  V(A)=C(G|A) 
Here G amounts to the proposition that something objectively good happens 
(Lewis, 1996, p. 307). Since DBN is intended to express strong anti-
Humeanism, it should contradict both H1 and H2, and indeed it does. It 
contradicts H1 because it implies that facts about what a rational agent 
values, and thus desires, are fixed by her credences, and hence by her 
beliefs. It contradicts H2 because it implies that rational agents are all alike 
in having desires geared toward the same ultimate, objective good, 
embodied by G. 
Lewis is surprisingly non-hostile to strong anti-Humeanism as 
encapsulated in DBN. He says little about it — only that it is 
                                               
3 My own view is that Lewis’s (1976) result is definitely erroneous, but I will 
defend this claim elsewhere. 
4 Lewis (1996) instead calls these positions ‘Desire by Necessity’ and ‘Desire as 
Belief’. However, these terms are ambiguous since he uses them both as names of the 
two anti-Humean positions in question and as the names of formula that purportedly 
express these anti-Humean positions. Moreover, the terms are not especially clear — so 
I don’t use them. 
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a ‘comparatively simple and unproblematic version’ of anti-Humeanism 
(Lewis, 1996, p. 307). He makes no attempt to refute it. His lack of interest 
in refuting strong anti-Humeanism is presumably to be explained in terms 
of his being a sufficiently committed Humean to think strong anti-
Humeanism has no real chance of being true (due to its radical denial of 
H2). Weak anti-Humeanism poses a much more credible threat to 
Humeanism. 
Lewis proceeds to critique various possible formulations of weak anti-
Humeanism, including both his own DAB and Price’s DACB. As we have 
seen, he holds that DAB is untenable because it falls prey to the updating 
argument. His response to Price, in contrast, is that DACB turns out, upon 
analysis, to be re-expressible as DBN. His complaint against DACB is 
therefore that it is not a version of weak anti-Humeanism after all. It is just 
strong anti-Humeanism in disguise. In Lewis’ words, DACB is ‘a form of 
anti-Humeanism, sure enough, but not the right form of anti-Humeanism’ 
(Lewis, 1996, p. 313). 
Now, in my above rebuttal of the updating argument I showed that CC is 
true, and when DAB and CC are put together they entail a theory strikingly 
similar to DBN. (More on this shortly.) This being so, Lewis might reply to 
me much as he replies to Price. Specifically, he might contend that I have 
rescued DAB from the jaws of the updating argument only by showing that 
DAB amounts to a form, not of weak anti-Humeanism, but of DBN, 
and thus of strong anti-Humeanism. In other words, Lewis might, while 
conceding that I have refuted his updating argument (a major concession on 
his part), claim that I have nevertheless played into his hands by providing 
an alternative proof of the result he is after: viz., that DAB is not a tenable 
form of weak anti-Humeanism. 
My counter-reply to this potential reply of Lewis’ is to deny that DAB 
and CC together entail a form of strong anti-Humeanism. (I believe Price 
could respond similarly with regards DACB.) 
DAB and CC together entail a theory I will call ‘DAB+’: 
DAB:   V(A)=C(A) 
CC:  C(A)=C(H|A) 
DAB+:   V(A)=C(H|A) 
DAB+ and DBN certainly appear to be very similar theories. Indeed, they 
appear to share precisely the same logical form, with the only difference 
between them being that where DAB+ references H, DBN instead 
references G. But this apparent similarity is, I will now show, merely 
superficial. When quantifiers are brought into the open, the two views are 
exposed as having different logical forms. 
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To see this, let’s start with DAB. Lewis proposes DAB as a formulation 
of weak, rather than strong, anti-Humeanism. This raises a puzzle. On 
the face of it, since DAB says simply that V(A)=C(A), DAB would seem to 
imply that if two rational agents share all the same beliefs, and thus assign 
the same credences to all propositions, then they will necessarily share the 
same values, and so share the same desires. Thus, DAB would appear to be 
inconsistent with the possibility of a pair of equally well-informed rational 
agents with the same priors diverging in what they desire. If this were right 
then DAB would entail the falsity of H2 as well as the falsity of H1, and so 
it would be a form of strong anti-Humeanism, not of weak anti-Humeanism. 
The solution to this puzzle lies in recognizing that the halo function is 
intended by Lewis to be agent-relative. Different rational agents can 
potentially have different halo functions. That is, it can potentially be 
the case that for one agent, A=P, while for a second agent, A=Q, where P 
and Q are different propositions. If these two agents share all the same 
beliefs, then they will agree in the credences they assign to P and Q 
respectively. But they will nevertheless differ in how much they value, and 
thus desire, A’s being the case, for where the first agent is concerned, 
V(A)=C(A)=C(P), while for the second agent, V(A)=C(A)=C(Q).  
Recall that H is characterized by reference to the halo function (since H 
is defined such that (1) and (2) come out as true). This being so, it follows 
from the fact that Lewis’ halo function is agent-relative that H will be 
agent-relative too. With this in mind, consider the following two rival ways 
in which DAB+ might be formulated when quantifiers are brought into the 
open: 
DAB+1:  ∃H∀x∀A: Vx(A)=Cx(H|A) 
DAB+2:  ∀x∃H∀A: Vx(A)=Cx(H|A) 
Here Vx(A) denotes the value assigned by a rational agent, x, to an outcome, 
A. Similarly, Cx denotes the credence function used by x. Notice that, 
because of where the existential quantifier is positioned, DBN+1 implies 
that there is a single proposition, H, which serves as a universal ‘yardstick’ 
against which every rational agent measures the values of outcomes. On the 
other hand, DBN+2 is consistent with the possibility of different agents 
using different versions of H as their respective yardsticks for measuring 
value. Clearly the idea that the halo function, and thus the identity of H, can 
vary between rational agents is correctly captured by DBN+2, but not by 
DBN+1. We should therefore understand DBN+ as being equivalent to 
DBN+2, not as being equivalent to DBN+1. 
Let’s now turn to DBN, two rival formulations of which are as follows: 
DBN1: ∃G∀x∀A:  Vx(A)=Cx(G|A) 
DBN2:  ∀x∃G∀A:  Vx(A)=Cx(G|A) 
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DBN is, of course, intended by Lewis to encapsulate strong anti-
Humeanism, with the idea being that G represents an objective good, that is 
the same for all rational agents and cannot vary between rational agents. 
This being so, it is obvious that DBN is to be correctly understood as saying 
the same thing as DBN1, not DBN2. 
Thus, when quantifiers are brought into the open DAB+ is revealed as 
being equivalent to DAB+2, while DBN is revealed as being equivalent to 
DBN1. Crucially, DAB+2 and DBN1 do not share the same logical form. 
Hence, initial appearance to the contrary notwithstanding, DAB+ and DBN 
do not share the same logical form either. They appear to share the same 
logical form only because of a scope ambiguity. When this ambiguity is 
resolved by bringing quantifiers into the open, it becomes clear that DAB+ 
is consistent with rational agents differing among each other in what they 
ultimately value, as per weak anti-Humeanism, while DBN instead entails 
that rational agents must be alike in what they ultimately value, as per 
strong anti-Humeanism. The potential objection here being considered — 
that by showing DAB entails DAB+ I have shown DAB to be a form of 
strong anti-Humeanism — is thus without foundation.  
6. Conclusion 
Lewis’ updating argument is, I believe, decisively refuted by the above 
proof of CC. If this is right then anti-Humeans (weak anti-Humeans 
included), value-realists, and objectivists about ethics have nothing to fear, 
at least where this particular threat to their philosophies is concerned. 
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Abstract. One of the most controversial theses of Jacques Lacan is his conviction that a 
very specific relationship links ethics and desire. The aim of the article is to present 
what this new relationship consists in, and, further on, to outline the weaknesses of this 
concept, which does not take into account the existence of the sovereign good as 
a category available to cognition. According to my thesis, Lacan believes that the ethics 
of Supreme Good, or simply traditional ethics of goods, leads the human subject to 
remain, voluntarily (and perhaps thoughtlessly), within the Imaginary dimension. The 
idea of the ethical postulate will be treated here not so much as something applied 
during psychoanalysis, but as a general clue as to how people should behave. 
Preliminary remarks 
One of the most controversial theses of Jacques Lacan is his conviction that 
a very specific relationship links ethics and desire. The aim of the article is 
to present what this new relationship consists in, and, further on, to outline 
the weaknesses of this concept, which does not take into account the 
existence of the sovereign good as a category available to cognition. 
According to my thesis, Lacan believes that the ethics of Supreme Good, or 
simply traditional ethics of goods, leads the human subject to remain, 
voluntarily (and perhaps thoughtlessly), within the Imaginary dimension. 
The idea of the ethical postulate will be treated here not so much as 
something applied during psychoanalysis, but as a general clue as to how 
people should behave. It also seems reasonable to draw attention to the 
understanding of the word „Other,” which I will use here. This concept can 
be understood in different ways, as the history of philosophy shows. For 
example, Emmanuel Levinas calls the „face” of another person the Other, 
and in his thought the relationship with the Other consists in the immediacy 
of experience, where the Other is the same as man or God (of course, 
I present it in very simple terms, only for the purpose of contrasting it with 
Lacan's attitude). For the French psychoanalyst, the Other refers to 
the symbolic order — it is language and a set of social rules. Lacan wrote: 
“Before human relationships are strictly established, some relationships are 
already determined” (Lacan, 1973, p. 18). Therefore, the Other is not 
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another subject (God, man, animal), but an order of mediation not existing 
in reality. Human relationships do not exist other than mediated by the 
Other, and, therefore, they are always complex and full of confusion (hence 
the thesis about the non-existence of sexual relation1). Such 
an understanding of the Other involves the issue of the triadic division 
of human “willings” into: need (besoin), demand (demande), and desire 
(désir).  
Desire and demand 
Lacan argues that ethical action consists in “realizing one's desire,”2 which 
means, at the same time, acting according to specifically understood 
Symbolic law. Lacan clearly emphasized: “This is so evidently the case that 
one can, in short, say that the genesis of the moral dimension in Freud's 
theoretical elaboration is located nowhere else than in desire itself” (Lacan, 
1997, p. 5). How to understand this enigmatic statement? First, let us focus 
on the difference between desire and demand. According to Lacan, a human 
being lives in three dimensions, which he calls the Imaginary, 
the Symbolic, and the Real.3 The Imaginary might be determined 
by knowledge (about oneself and the world), the Symbolic — by the Other, 
and the Real — by what exists like the Kantian noumenon, and this 
noumenon is not only cognizable but also traumatic. The three orders 
“function” in a Borromean knot, which is so intertwined that the disruption 
of one of the loops releases the others. This means that man cannot be 
described by a single order. Man is not a creature who will remain only 
in the Imaginary or only in the Symbolic or only in the Real. Lacan pointed 
out at one of his seminars: “There is no way one can reduce desire in order 
to make it emerge, emanate, from the dimension of need” (Lacan, 1997, 
p. 169) because need is the condition of a demand. Demand comes from the 
Imaginary and has a particular place in the subject, associated with this 
particular order. Demand is specific: when I am hungry, I demand good 
food. The question arises: why do I demand food instead of just eating? 
Demand differs from need by the fact of approaching the Other (that is, 
in this context: „I am hungry — feed me”). Demand cannot be reduced 
to need, and this is due to the fact that the subject's being continually 
intersects with the field of the Other. Demand is defined by the fact that 
there is the Other. When my demand is satisfied, I feel a momentary sense 
of satisfaction and I often feel that it is too small anyway. The food could 
still be better, better served, etc. Therefore, despite satisfying a demand, 
and thus meeting a specific need, the satisfaction is still not enough. This 
                                                        
1Lacan (1999a, p 47). 
2This thesis often appears in Lacan (1997). 
3This is completely explained by Lacan in Lacan (2015) 
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constant hysterical questioning, this constant „that is not this” (the subject 
as such is a hysterical subject for Lacan). In other words, satisfying 
a demand may take place but only in the register of the Imaginary. At this 
point, the matter of subject's ethics would not have any foundation at all, 
i.e., if the subject only existed in the order of the Imaginary. Demand as 
such does not involve ethics in the subject. Paradoxically, however, desire 
is related to demand, because it is defined as the difference between need 
and demand — a desire is a negativised demand. It happens because the 
desire is only expressed by the demand, so to speak: the demand is not 
direct. The desire somehow „degrades” itself to the demand, but the content 
of demand does not constitute the content of desire. This sometimes 
happens with the demands of a psychotic subject (and more specifically — 
a psychotic subject does not actually have desires, only demands), but that’s 
not the subject of my considerations here. Apart from exceptional cases, 
there is no situation in which a human being only expects to satisfy 
demands. Satisfying a demand is always accompanied by something more, 
and this „more” is given or not, as if involuntarily. I am referring again to 
the example of the demand for a meal. The child says that he/she is hungry. 
However, quite often, the reason for the demand is not the actual need, but 
a desire for love and intimacy with the mother. The meal served 
by the mother (or sometimes not served) stimulates the child to interpret 
the desires of the mother. Satisfying the demand (or not), the mother 
can offer dinner to the child as: evidence of concern, even a kind 
of punishment or reward, or a proof of love. At the same time this concern, 
punishment, or reward is a matter of interpretation of the mother's desire 
by the child. The child's desire introduces this child into the relationship's 
circle of the mother's desires. Therefore, the served meal does not only 
satisfy the need evoked by hunger and the demand for food, but it starts 
an endless game, the dialectics of desire and demand. In this sense, desire 
is always the desire of the Other and cannot be of different character. Desire 
is this part which is formed after the demand passes through the field of 
the Other. 
Desire as desire for desire and defense against jouissance 
Lacan defines desire as “a desire for unfulfilled desire” because it is related 
to the Symbolic. We can hear the echo of the Hegelian dialectics of Master-
Slave, but, for Lacan, synthesis is not achieved.4 Desire cannot be fulfilled 
due to the fact that this is desire of the Other in every possible sense: I 
desire the desire of the Other, I desire the Other to desire me, I desire 
                                                        
4Lacan was (together with many other French intellectuals) a dedicated listener of 
Alexander Kojeve’s lectures on Hegel. These lectures are available in English: Kojeve 
(1969). 
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the Other by myself, I desire to be in the desire of the Other, I desire 
the Other to be in my desire, etc. When I desire something, it is not that 
I want to satisfy my need (which may be, in the common opinion, either 
good or bad), but I am trying to guess what the Other wants, how to become 
desired by the Other; his/her desire is a mystery for the subject, which 
makes insisting on the desire an attempt to capture what the Other wants 
from me. For further clarification: Lacanian “Que vuoi?” means “what 
do you want?” rather than “what do you want from me?.” If the subject 
expresses its demand towards the Other, it behaves neurotically: a neurotic 
person wants the Other to tell him/her what he wants from the subject; 
the neurotic does not want to solve the mystery of the Other's desire, he/she 
wants the Other to give straight answers. But such an answer does not exist 
(in terms of the Hegelian synthesis). 
Still another definition of desire is describing it as refraining from 
satisfaction. Lacan calls the desire a defense against jouissance, which is 
instinctive, and, as such, beyond good and evil. Now, I will try to explain 
what Lacan means by jouissance and how it relates to the question of 
desire. Jouissance is the satisfaction of a drive that accompanies every 
activity of the subject, and this drive has only got one aim: to „take 
delight.” Well, Lacan in his famous text of Ècrits II 5 postulates 
the “equality” of all acts of jouissance. It means that both the subject doing 
evil (e.g. killing animals for pleasure) and the subject doing good (in this 
context, it could be a defender of animals' rights) will experience the same 
satisfaction from the act of jouissance. Why are these acts morally 
indistinguishable? This is proved by the fact that those who support 
the good which is widely accepted by the society will automatically exclude 
those who support the opposite (they do evil, they are torturers, murderers 
— for example of human fetuses, animals, etc.). A common result of such 
exclusion is opposing the “sinners” by taking the place of the previous 
“sinners.” In this way, as Lacan writes, stakes are burning where the bad are 
sacrificed for the so-called common good, but they are sacrificed using the 
methods of hated executioners. This shows how variable jouissance 
is and how easy it is to go from doing good to doing evil. That is why, as 
I wrote, it is beyond ethics, beyond good and evil. And therefore every type 
of jouissance (even an animal rights activist who devotes his/her money 
and time to this activity) is dangerous, as it can quickly reveal its “evil” 
instinctual face to the subject.6 Desire is not associated with evil, because 
doing evil is connected with a specific deed performed at a definite time 
                                                        
5See Lacan (1999b, pp. 243-273). 
6Peter Singer wrote in this context about the acts of violence connected with 
defending animal rights. Obviously, these acts were condemned by Singer, using 
arguments which coincide with mine as presented in this article, see Singer (2004, 
pp. 24-25). 
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(a deed which is a good for the subject, provided that we leave behind 
the naive understanding of the good as something positive in the opinions 
of civilized societies) and can only respond to the demand of the subject. 
A deed dictated by the knowledge of the good looks like a satisfied demand 
— it is complete and finished, and it gives some satisfaction. But 
satisfaction is addictive because there is never enough of it — there is 
a need, therefore, to perform new deeds in the name of the “good,” the need 
“of one more effort” as in Marquis de Sade.7 The infinity of jouissance is 
not the same as the infinity of desire for two reasons. First, simply because 
it is jouissance, and so something that belongs to the instinctual and non-
ethical sphere. Second, because it does not attempt to deal with 
the structural deficiency of the human being (more on that later) and does 
not try to complete it, as „lighting stakes” in the name of a deliberately 
established good may increase injustice, sometimes more than the omission 
of such actions. Meanwhile, desire (another definition) must be based 
on the knowledge of its jouissance; this is an absolutely necessary 
condition. To get involved in the game of desire, my desire and Others’ 
desire, is to enter and unending game. The ordinary hurting of a living 
creature, whether for material benefit or through the discharge 
of aggression, is, similarly to eating a meal which only satisfies hunger, 
the completion of a demand, the same as planting a bomb at an abortion 
clinic (in good faith, of course). Desire is not satisfied with a single instance 
of fulfillment, because that fulfillment leads one closer to the inability 
to satisfy desire. Desire is the desire for the Other, and it is therefore 
the desire for an unfulfilled desire. We will never know what we want 
or what the Other really wants from us or what we can offer him 
as Symbolic beings. Desire is almost Pythian, because we cannot satisfy 
it completely when we do not know what exactly it concerns. Therefore, 
evil, as an egoistic desire for still more objects, is not, according to Lacan, 
located in the Symbolic dimension, but merely in the Imaginary, and thus it 
is always related to demand and never to desire. Also, only at the level of 
the Imaginary does a particular object appear as a reason (in the Symbolic 
register, it is an effect) for a demand. At this level, the principle of pleasure 
is in force, in opposition to morality and to the order of the Real. Demand is 
demanding of pleasure and is accompanied by the knowledge of what this 
pleasure consists in, what object it needs, and how to achieve it. However, 
if we agree with Lacan that “knowledge is the appearance of truth,” (Lacan, 
1999a, p. 135) it turns out that we only have false knowledge about 
the goods that we want to have and give. But concerning desire, we cannot 
even obtain such apparent knowledge. However mysterious it may sound, 
desire has to be “retrieved”: as if “pulled out” of the unconscious with 
                                                        
7 Sade (1970), pp. 81-112. 
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the help of words. Therefore, postulates or rather guidelines for 
the direction of desire penetrate one’s consciousness with difficulty, 
and this process is connected with moral development of the individual. In 
this sense, morality has to do with the truth of the subject — the truth about 
the unconscious of the drive, about its own jouissance.  
Desire as filling in the lack 
What is the role of desire when it comes to jouissance? One must recall 
here the Lacanian teaching about structural lack in the Symbolic order. 
The lack (referred to as phallus) makes the world always appear defective. 
Its root cause, however, does not lie in the nature of the world, but in the 
incompatibility between humans and the world. Man is the only creature 
who lives not so much in the world, but in language. And because, firstly, 
language creates the ontology of our being, and, secondly, language has 
a hole8 which is impossible to fill in, to us the world will always seem 
unjust, merciless, inhuman, etc. All that the attempts to repair the whole 
world do is allow the repairers of all sorts to experience pleasure, and they 
lead to further manifestations of evil. Real good, according to Lacan and 
as I have already mentioned, is not an answer to the need produced by 
demand. No object of need is the good. It cannot be so, because it is 
a necessity. There is also no knowledge of the needs of beings other than 
the subject himself. In contrast, the objects of desire are only a possibility, 
they appear metonymically. Desire is always metonymic.9 No object will 
meet the expectations of man's desire, because it is never the right object. 
Objects are apparent. Desire is realized through the Symbolic. This means 
that the aim of desire is not an object, but that the latter (according 
to Lacan's terminology, ‘objet petit a’) is produced as a kind of surplus 
in the relation of the subject to its desire (Lacan defines ‘phantasm’, that 
is, the function of the subject in relation to its desire, as: S <> a, where the 
crossed out “S” signifies the position of the subject towards the object, 
“<>„ is the relation of desire, and “a” is the object). In other words: 
the object is a result of desire, not the reason for it, or more precisely: desire 
„has” its object which is at the same time its cause, while there is no object 
                                                        
8 The hole that we find in language is a result of the otherness of language vis-a-vis 
the world. The language and the world are two different entities, but a human being 
„lives” only in language, and therefore his/her direct contact with the world is 
impossible. I expand on this in Choińska (2014), chapter III. 
9 Lacan describes metonymy with the help of the following equation: f 
(S….S`)S=S(-)s, which means that the line between the signifying and the signified 
is not crossed. And metaphor is presented in other equation: f(S`/S)S= S(+)s, which 
means that the line is crossed, which enables creation of new meanings which are called 
creating or poetical by Lacan. See Dor (1998, pp. 52-53). 
Following Desire as the Ethical Postulate 35 
 
 
that would be the aim of desire — desire aims not for an object, but 
for satisfaction; that is why objects are not only apparent, but also variable. 
Desire, in contrast to demand, is an attempt to patch up the Symbolic hole, 
and therefore it is an infinite process. It is unethical not to desire, not 
to insist on desire, because when we cease to desire, the jouissance comes 
onto the stage and reigns.  
Object a is only an appearance, and hence desire cannot be a wish to do 
evil. ‘Petit a’ on the Imaginary level is associated with the fear of 
aggression by some presumed other “I,” wanting to rob us of our good.10 
Also, it is just a picture of the good belonging to me as an ideal 
(narcissistic) “I,” so in fact, just a mirage of “I.” Lacan talks elsewhere11 
about the reduction of ethical order to social coercion. This can be seen 
particularly clearly, in my opinion, when social coercion of late capitalism 
takes on the form of generating demands and encouraging endless 
purchases of certain goods. On the other hand, in order to sustain desire it is 
necessary to leave behind goods understood as Imaginary objects, hence 
the connection between desire and ethics, one of the features of which, 
as Kant already pointed out, is disinterestedness. In this sense, Jonathan 
Safran Foer wrote about the human necessity to deny oneself a (e.g. non-
kosher) meal, even during extreme famine.12 He wrote about his 
grandmother, who was starving at the end of the war, but when a Ukrainian 
peasant brought her a piece of pork meat, she refused to eat it, explaining: 
“If nothing matters, there is no point in saving anything”(Foer, 2013, p. 20). 
Lacan's Ethics. Ethics of desire for death? 
Desire, through its emphasis on satisfaction, complicates traditional ethics, 
and Lacan's ethics is sketched out somewhat across traditional ethics. This 
is because the latter has a problem with calling the subject's satisfaction 
(that is: my own) a good. If satisfaction is taken into account at all 
in classical ethics, it is only as the satisfaction of the Other. And Lacan 
claims that the satisfaction of the Other is merely our interpretation 
of it. We can only feel our own satisfaction. And so our own satisfaction 
should be what we deal with, e.g. through neutralization, limitation, etc. 
In this context, it becomes necessary to clarify the relationship between 
desire and law, and it can be bluntly said and that desire is simply the law. 
Moral law is articulated in relation to the Real (Thing, das Ding). Sade's 
law is the opposite of the Kantian imperative: this is ethics without feelings 
(of mercy or compassion). Sade’s imperative is: “Take delight” regardless 
of whether it makes you feel pleased or not. The Kantian imperative 
                                                        
10 Lacan raises this topic in Le stade du miror, in Lacan (1966). 
11 Lacan (1997, p. 240). 
12 Foer (2013). 
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is: „Follow your duty,” regardless of the fact that emotions often dictate 
the violation of this law. Therefore, both Sade and Kant, in the 
interpretation of Lacan, try to persuade us to take instinctual delight, 
although they seemingly stand at opposite poles. For, would the punishment 
for non-compliance with the Kantian duty be not performed with equal 
delight as the obligation itself? According to the French psychoanalyst, 
in both of these conceptions there is not enough knowledge about the 
„horror” of jouissance. Meanwhile, desire is always a desire for death — it 
is a consequence of his theory of desire that it cannot stop even for 
a moment. There are no unethical desires. Eventually, desire (as I 
understand it) is fulfilled in the moment of complete dedication. Therefore, 
the one who continues to desire is a Hegelian Master — and is not afraid 
of death. Desire as desire for death is also related to the fact that there is 
no mediation between the order of the Real (Thing) and pleasure. What 
comes from jouissance is a prohibition and transgression of jouissance 
itself, and this transgression is only possible if it is supported 
by the Symbolic law. 
If we follow a deconstructive understanding of Fromm's opposition 
of being and having,13 we will admit that being might also be a kind 
of possession, and then, in this context, we can understand the attitude 
of Antigone (I will return to the problem of Antigone later). According  
to Lacan, “Antigone appears as airrovogos, as a pure and simple relationship 
of the human being to that of which he miraculously happens to be the bearer, 
namely, the signifying cut that confers on him the indomitable power of being 
what he is in the face of everything that may oppose him” (Lacan, 1997, 
p. 224). If we assume that life is a kind of good we own, then the idea 
of resignation from life in favor of sustaining the desire to be something 
more than an owner explains partially the attitude of Antigone and her 
readiness to die. Lacan wrote something similar about the Cathars: 
they had basically to desist from any act that might in any way favor the 
perpetuation of the world, considered as execrable and bad in its essence. 
The practice of perfection thus consisted essentially in seeking to achieve 
death in the most advanced state of detachment, which was a sign of 
reintegration into an Edenic world characterized by purity and light, the true 
world of the original good Creator, whose creation had been sullied by the 
intervention of the bad Creator or Demiurge (Lacan, 1997, p. 103). 
To forestall the interpretations (as to the intentions of Lacan as a singer 
of death) evoked by Polish philosophers,14 I must add an important issue 
here. Lacan clearly distinguishes ethical actions associated with desire 
and leading toward the triumph of death from those which he called, 
                                                        
13 See Choińska (2012). 
14 See Bielik Robson (2008) and Dybel (2009). 
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probably inspired a bit by the language of Heidegger, a triumph of Being 
toward death. There are two ways of discussing (in one of the seminars) 
the problem of Antigone, who, in choosing death and relying on her own 
desire, gives up the goods which would keep her from realizing her desire. 
In contrast, the triumph of Being toward death is simply the triumph of life 
(Lacan writes here about those undergoing psychoanalysis who managed 
to go through it successfully and change their lives, by no means in 
the direction of allowing death to triumph). 
While fulfilling one's demands (in certain contexts we could even call 
them whims, more or less dangerous to others) means satisfying one’s 
needs and is associated with the principle of pleasure, paradoxically, 
the infinite following of desire touches the Real and the satisfaction 
of one’s drives. That satisfaction which Freud described as a satisfaction 
so unwanted in our dreams that we wake up in horror.15 Fulfilling a desire 
encounters two obstacles: the first is the horror of jouissance that the desire 
„is spinning” around, and which we can determine at the level of the subject 
as the threat of pain and the fear of the unknown. The second obstacle 
is the beauty filling up our phantasm, which disarms our desire. This 
is a situation in which we are afraid to „touch” our desire, and what appears 
in place of a confrontation with it is art, poetry, or, when it’s an average 
analysant — not an artist — references to them.—If the way of 
an individual to becoming ethical does not consist in the fulfillment 
of demands, and the way of desire must be “retrieved,” beauty can 
somehow make this last thing impossible, because it allows the subject 
to experience the feeling of the sublime (other than the sense of the good). 
Nevertheless, both the desire of an uneasy satisfaction related to jouissance, 
which is the mystery of the Real, and the sense of beauty or sublimity, are 
equally an obstacle to accessing the subject’s desire and a kind of bait, 
a point for the enigmatic desire to take hold. Pain opens us to the limit 
of the Thing before its absolute neither good nor evil. As for jouissance, 
there is a phenomenon that Lacan calls the “tyranny of memory,” where 
memory is a rival of ordinary pleasure and also satisfaction. This is 
the memory of the Real, of trauma, of life and death. The subject 
is (to paraphrase here the famous phrase by Bielik-Robson) “an animal that 
forgets too easily,” but must become responsible also for what it has 
forgotten. Beauty, on the other hand, may turn out to be “the splendor 
of truth”; it sublimates our drive and satisfies it somehow. “Sublimation 
is the satisfaction of the drive with a change of object, that is, without 
repression” (Lacan, 1997, p. 230). The situation of the good as satisfaction 
and of beauty as a phantasm, both of which limit and, at the same time, 
enable access to desire, is, as we can see, paradoxical. 
                                                        
15 Freud (1996). 
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Lacan (following Freud) distinguishes between primary processes, 
dominated by the identity rule of pleasure (there is only pain and pleasure 
here, but pain is to be avoided) and also by the knowledge of the goods 
which the subject wants to have and bestow onto others, and secondary 
processes, determined by the rule of reality, where perception lies (rather 
than thinking). Only at this level does the key to the ethics 
of psychoanalysis appear. The secondary processes, which we access 
through certain known words, allow us to combine these with 
the unconscious in such a way that they can move into the chain 
of meaningful associations appearing already at the conscious level. In this 
sense, desire cannot be based on knowledge — on the contrary, it should 
be based on: first, the feeling of one’s own satisfaction while, second, this 
satisfaction cannot be combined with an ordinary surrender to jouissance. 
Desire protects against pleasure connected with the drive thanks to 
the intention of the one trying to “patch up” the lack in the world, because 
from the point of view of the ethical subject there is too little good 
in the world, too little justice, etc. Thus, desire operates in the sphere 
of the Symbolic. 
The drive has two dimensions. It tends to reach entropy balance in 
non-organic matter. In the dimension of history, the drive is in the chain of 
the signifying, and its manifestation begins with the first word, which, 
touching other words, will create the “personality” (“extimacy”) 
of the subject, that subject taking its own road toward death. Antigone 
defying Creon in the name of blood ties with her dead brother is, as Lacan 
says, the image of barbaric mercy. Antigone's desire is destructive; it can 
be contrasted with the wicked lust of her mother — Jocasta. Antigone is 
the guardian of a dead criminal on account of the memory of individual 
signifiers — subjects: brothers, one of whom could experience the so-called 
„second death,” being crossed out of the chain of the signifying. That 
is why Antigone’s attitude is a revelation, shining with splendor. Antigone 
cannot agree to Creon’s recommendations and become the one who serves 
the goods (the common good of the society). Then she would have 
committed the sin of forgetting about the bonds which had located her 
and her family within the chain of the signifying. Beyond this chain — of 
Antigone as a heroic creature — she does not exist as a subject. This is very 
important: breaking the Borromean knot and crossing the subject out 
of the Symbolic reduces him or her to the Real, that is, to the Thing. 
And that makes this subject disappear, reducing it to a „whirl” of drives, 
to what is beyond good and evil. 
If sublimation involves only the change of the object, then Antigone 
changes the object in itself, not exchanging it for another, but, as Lacan 
claims, from the point of view of the “Last Judgment,” no object can be 
in this case better than another. Thus something completely new must 
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be involved here — a change of attitude. Antigone is ready to die. 
The lesson psychoanalysis teaches us is that the idea of a sovereign good 
is based on demands, on the order of the Imaginary, and therefore it shows 
their futility. Creon is the one who demonstrates the impossibility 
of, or rather the leaving behind of, this desire. That is why his defeat 
is of a different kind: it is the sheer triumph of death. Creon is entangled 
in traditional ethics; he is concerned with serving the goods, which, in his 
case, is strongly connected to the role of power he represents. But authority 
is not interested in the desires of subjects (“it always makes desires wait”), 
which is particularly visible in the authorities in the capitalist system 
(or in the authority of capital, or of capitalistic discourse): all it can offer 
to its citizens is showering them with various goods, as if from the horn 
of plenty. Citizens are persuaded to buy these goods with the help 
of advertising, “scientific” opinions, etc. In conclusion: Lacan opposes 
serving the goods to following one’s desire. 
Psychoanalysis attempts to restore to the subject its relationship with 
desire; analytical activity is strictly ethical and in the service of ethics; 
healing happens as if incidentally, it is a result of ethics, and not 
of demands. The subject has to position him/herself in the whole tragic 
sense of life, rather than merely choose the goods (for him/herself and 
others), because they only bring a momentary joy. They do not give 
the subject the ability to self-actualize, making it impossible to “cure” either 
neurosis, or perversion, or even so-called existential problems. Thus, 
the greatest fault is to stop „insisting on one’s desire,” i.e., betraying one’s 
own desire. When we give up our desire, it is only in the name of some 
goods. But whose goods are they? How do we know what others expect, 
since, even when they tell us what they want, or (as in the case of animals) 
when we guess what they want, we only touch the “appearance of truth”? 
Desire has something of the Real — it stubbornly places us again and again 
on the same path towards its fulfillment. And if desire is not finite 
(in contrast to satisfying hunger), we can say that it never gives up and thus 
it constitutes a triumph of Being toward death (with special emphasis on 
Being). With desire, we pay off the debt in the form of mercy or 
compassion. And when we give up desire, we betray ourselves and others. 
Desire is a “metonymy of our being”; the good can only serve 
as payment for satisfying a desire. In fact, desire can even overcome fear 
and pity, not by following the good (because it does not know anything 
about it), but by creating it as it fills the lack in the Symbolic. However, 
knowledge or memory about the impulsive nature of human beings 
is necessary here. Knowledge and memory not about the sovereign good, 
but about the fact that the subject is also a Thing out of the order 
of the Real. 
40 Bogna Choińska 
 
 
Final remarks. Introduction to a critique of Lacan's ethics 
The departure from the concept of the sovereign good, and particularly 
from the theory of values which exist in a transcendent way, raises serious 
doubts. First of all, the area of ethics, deprived of absolute (or even any) 
knowledge of the good — and this attitude is not only typical for Lacan, but 
for the whole poststructuralist formation (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard)16 — 
remains a “wild” area. In my opinion, such an understanding of ethics is not 
enough to guarantee ethical behavior, as what is assumed here is 
the possibility of completely distancing oneself from knowledge about 
the good and relying instead on acts based on the satisfaction of desire. 
Does this exclude unworthy behavior, especially when we take into 
consideration not only the development of a specific subject, but the idea 
of moral progress of the whole society? I do not think so. For this larger 
area, in my opinion, cannot remain deprived of a hierarchy of good and evil 
based on the knowledge that every subject acquires while growing up in 
a society. This means, in turn, that such knowledge also functions 
in psychoanalysis, but in a somehow unconscious and “thoughtless” way. 
Therefore, even if we have high self-awareness (in the psychoanalytical 
sense), we still have to make ethical life decisions, endlessly. After all, 
abandoning knowledge about both the object of the good we are aiming 
at and the reasons for our decision creates a situation where we have to rely 
only on a „wild” act dictated by... we do not actually know what. In my 
opinion, such an act, despite assurances from the followers 
of poststructuralist ethics about its “purity,” remains entangled in the theory 
of values, even though it is consciously rejected. And if this theory 
is rejected, it is not clear whether it does not get replaced by superstitions 
and prejudices that may cause unconscious evil. As it is not possible 
to discuss all my doubts within the scope of this article, I can only signal 
these difficulties here. For the purpose here was to present Lacan’s position, 
as his theory deeply influenced thinking about ethics within the whole 
post-structuralist tradition. My critique will be developed in subsequent 
publications. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
16 See my work Choińska (2014). 
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Abstract. This paper has three interdependent aims. The first is to make Reichenbach’s 
views on induction and probabilities clearer, especially as they pertain to his pragmatic 
justification of induction. The second aim is to show how his view of pragmatic 
justification arises out of his commitment to extensional empiricism and moots 
the possibility of a non-pragmatic justification of induction. Finally, and most 
importantly, a formal decision-theoretic account of Reichenbach’s pragmatic 
justification is offered in terms both of the minimax principle and of the dominance 
principle. 
1. Introduction 
Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic treatment of the problem of induction 
(presented and developed in his 1949a, 1932/1949b and 1949c) was, 
and still is, of great interest. However, various influential commentators 
have dismissed it as a pseudo-solution and/or regarded it as problematically 
obscure.1 This is, in large part, due to the difficulty in understanding exactly 
what Reichenbach’s solution is supposed to amount to, especially as it 
appears to offer no response to the inductive skeptic. As Laurence BonJour 
claims, 
…the significance of Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification remains obscure. As he 
himself insists, that justification still yields no reason at all for thinking that 
inductive conclusions, or any of the myriad further beliefs which are epistemically 
dependent on them, are to any degree likely to be true. The sort of justification in 
question is thus not epistemic justification, as that concept was construed above; to 
show that beliefs are justified in this alternative way does not answer, or even 
purport to answer, the basic skeptical worry about induction, and is indeed quite 
compatible with the deepest degree of skepticism. It is thus hard to see why it 
should be regarded as any sort of solution to the classical problem of induction 
(BonJour 1986, p. 99). 
                                               
1 See, e.g., Skyrms (1966), Salmon (1966), BonJour (1986), BonJour (1992), 
BonJour (1998), Rosenkrantz (1981), and Kelly (1991). 
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This sort of dismissal of Reichenbach’s views on induction surely depends 
to some degree on his adherence to the controversial frequency 
interpretation of the concept of probability.2 This is plausible to assume in 
light of the wide-spread popularity of subjectivism about probability that 
has dominated probability theory subsequent to Reichenbach’s work 
and this aspect of Reichenbach’s approach to induction has been treated 
at length in a variety of other places.3 Another aspect of his vindication that 
likely fuels the charge of obscurity is the failure of these critics to pay more 
attention to Reichenbach’s commitment to a purely extensional 
metaphysics. Finally, Reichenbach’s attempt to rationally ground induction 
on the basis of purely pragmatic considerations is also likely to have, 
at least in part, given rise to the charges of obscurity and failure.4 This last 
point is especially important because Reichenbach is rather cavalier 
and informal in his assertion of the claim that following the inductive rule 
is the best thing to do from a pragmatic perspective. 
First, it will be shown here that what Reichenbach does in his later work 
on induction is to establish an important epistemic limitation of extensional 
empiricism and that there really is nothing especially obscure about 
Reichenbach’s thoughts on induction in this respect. He was simply 
working out the limits of extensional empiricism with respect to inductive 
inference. In fact, Reichenbach conveys this very point to Russell in an 
important letter in 1949.5 It will be shown that these aspects 
of Reichenbach’s position lead directly to his assertion that the only manner 
in which the inductive rule can be justified in the primitive state of 
knowledge prior to making sequences of inductive inferences is pragmatic 
in nature. Finally, and more constructively, it will be shown here that there 
are perfectly coherent, formal and pragmatic justifications of Reichenbach’s 
inductive rule in the primitive state of knowledge in the forms 
of the maximin rule for decision making and the dominance principle. With 
this account of the pragmatic justification of induction in hand, we will see 
                                               
2 Hájek (1997, 2009). 
3 See, e.g., Skyrms (1966), Salmon (1963), Salmon (1966), Galvaotti (2011) 
and Teng and Kyburg (2001). 
4 The sense of pragmatics used here is just the idea that there are justifications that 
are non-epistemic (i.e. not related to truth, approximate truth or probability) and which 
are based on some more or less well-understood notion of instrumental success 
or utility. 
5 The letter is a response to Russell’s criticisms of Reichenbach’s approach to 
the problem of induction as presented in Russell’s Our Knowledge of the External 
World. This approach stands in sharp contrast to Reichenbach’s early work which 
resembles Russell’s approach in holding that the principle that grounds induction is 
synthetic a priori. See Eberhardt (2011) for discussion of Reichenbach’s early views. 
He explicitly rejects this view in his later work and tells Russell in a 1949 letter that 
“Induction does not require an intensional logic” (1949d, p. 410). 
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that Reichenbach’s justification of induction can be given a principled 
ground. 
1.1 Overview 
Let us begin by recalling that Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification of 
induction is based on the following (reconstructed) line of argumentation 
(i.e. the basic Reichenbach argument): 
P1: Either nature is uniform or it is not. 
P2: If nature is uniform, then scientific induction will be successful. 
P3: If nature is not uniform, then no method will be successful. 
 If any method of induction will be successful, then scientific induction will be 
successful.6 
But, according to Reichenbach and echoing Hume, we cannot know 
whether nature is uniform or not, because it is neither a matter that can be 
settled a priori nor is it a matter that we can non-circularly establish 
a posteriori. So, as Reichenbach sees it, although we know that if any 
method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful, we cannot 
know that any method really is successful. The gist of his attempt to justify 
inductive practice then comes from the idea that while we do not know that 
any method will actually be successful, we also do not know that no method 
will be successful. Given this result and the fact that scientific induction can 
be shown to be an optimal method (in this important sense of “optimality”), 
we ought to accept induction as being justified, at least pragmatically 
speaking. As we shall see, what is at the heart of this view is Reichenbach’s 
metaphysical commitment to a form of extensional empiricism that 
tolerates only the existence of particulars. 
In any case, as Salmon correctly pointed out in his 1966, 
the Reichenbach argument depends on a false dichotomy. The uniformity of 
nature is, of course, not an all or nothing matter. We can, of course imagine 
possible worlds that contain only individuals with degrees of uniformity 
that vary radically. So, the uniformity of nature seems to be a matter of 
degree, and it is at least plausible to believe that there is a measure 
of the uniformity of extensional worlds. If this turns out to be viable, given 
the space of possible worlds U, we could define a measure m(x) on U such 
that m(x) maps the elements of U into the continuous open interval [0,1] 
                                               
6 This presentation of a simplified version of Reichenbach’s main argument is taken 
from Skyrms (1966). It is important to note at this juncture that the various criticisms of 
Reichenbach’s views, other than Russell’s, will (for the most part) be ignored here. To 
address all of those criticisms would require too much space, and the point of this paper 
is more historical in any case. 
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representing the uniformity of that extensional world. This suggests that 
Reichenbach’s attempt to justify induction needs to be retooled in order to 
accommodate a concept of world-uniformity that admits of continuous 
degrees. When this is done we can usefully reformulate the basic 
Reichenbach argument as follows. Consider our world wa (the actual world), 
where wa  U, with a fixed but unknown measure of uniformity, the set of 
all inductive methods Y,7 where yi  Y and such that each inductive method 
has a probability of arriving at a true conclusion in its domain of 
application, a function f(m(wn), yn) that maps worlds with degrees of world-
uniformity and inductive methods into the space of probabilities,8 
and a constant  that represents the chance probability of an inductive 
method succeeding at a world.9 If we understand  as the degree of world-
uniformity required for any inductive rule to be reliable with a reliability 
greater than chance, i.e. greater than , then the more sophisticated 
Reichenbach argument can be stated as follows: 
P1′: If the probability that m(wa) = 1 is 1, then scientific induction will be 
successful. 
P2′: If it is probable that 1 > m(wa) >  with probability less than 1 but greater than 
, then scientific induction will be successful with probability p, where p >  < 1. 
P3′: If it is probable that  > m(wa) > 0 with probability greater than 0 but less than 
, then scientific induction will be successful with probability p, where p <  < 0. 
P4′: If the probability that m(wa) = 0 is 1, then no inductive method will be 
successful. 
 If any inductive method will be successful, scientific induction will be 
successful. 
It should be noted that Reichenbach’s conclusion still holds in this case, 
and we will consider the significance of this conclusion in what follows. 
                                               
7 Inductive methods are, simply, rules for accepting conclusions concerning 
unobserved cases based on observed cases.  
8 The function f(m(wn), yn) seems, intuitively, to be a natural sort of function, as 
degrees of world-uniformity seem to be closely related to the probability with which 
a method produces true conclusions. What f(m(wn), yn) is supposed to yield 
is a probabilistic measure of the general reliability of a given method at a world with 
a given measure of uniformity, and, as we shall see in section 4, what this function 
really represents is the set of worlds where an inductive method with a well-defined 
probability of arriving at the correct value of a stable frequency will actually produce 
the correct values.  
9 In other words,  represents the threshold at which methods are no better at 
producing true conclusions than randomly selecting conclusions from the set of all 
statements of a given language £, and, as we shall see, a method that performs at 
a success rate no better than chance is no method at all. However, the general 
successfulness of an inductive method will turn out to be a more complex matter 
involving two aspects. The first concerns the reliability of the procedure in its domain, 
and the second concerns whether there exist elements of that domain at a world. 
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However, before we proceed to do so, it will be instructive to reconstruct 
Reichenbach’s treatment of induction in much greater detail in order to see 
just what it amounts to and what it implies about inductive inference. 
2. Reichenbach’s Conception of Scientific Induction 
The primary motivation that drove Reichenbach to propose his pragmatic 
justification of induction concerns a central feature of the frequency 
interpretation of the probability calculus. Familiarity with the details of 
the probability calculus will be assumed here, and with the fact that it is 
compatible with at least several interpretations. The axioms 
of the probability calculus are, of course, as follows: 
(A.1) P(a)  0 for all a in the domain of P(). 
(A.2) P(t) = 1 if t is a tautology. 
(A.3) P(a  b) = P(a) + P(b) if a and b and a  b are all in the domain of P(), and a 
and b are mutually exclusive. 
Recall that on Reichenbach’s frequency interpretation of probabilities such 
quantities are to be construed as tautological consequences of the 
probability calculus.10 More importantly, probabilities are to be regarded as 
measures of the limit of the relative frequency with which one contingent 
property is associated with another in an infinite sequence. More formally, 
the relative frequency of a pair of properties in a sequence is to be defined 
as follows: 
F n(A, B) = N n(A, B)/N n(A) 
Here F n(A, B) is the frequency of associated As and Bs in a sequence of 
length n. Given this conception of relative frequency we can then define 
the concept of probability as follows: 
P(A, B) = lim F n(A, B).11 
n   
Having introduced this notion of probability Reichenbach then proposes 
the rule of induction that states, 
If an initial section of n elements of a sequence xi is given, resulting in 
the frequency f n, and if, furthermore, nothing is known about the probability of 
the second level for the occurrence of a certain limit p, we posit that the frequency 
f i (i > n) will approach a limit p within f n   when the sequence is continued 
(Reichenbach, 1949c, p. 47). 
However, these definitions give rise to some very difficult but well-known 
problems concerning the existence of infinite sequences and the existence 
                                               
10 See Reichenbach (1949b) and Weatherford (1982), chapter 4. 
11 See Reichenbach (1949c) for details concerning how this derivation is carried out. 
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of such convergent limits.12 Reichenbach assumes that we are only ever 
aware of sequences that “…are not intensionally given, but are presented to 
us only by enumeration of their elements, i.e. are extensionally given 
(Reichenbach, 1949a, p. 309)” and that any such sequence of observed 
associations will be finite. Upon considering further extensional 
enumeration of the elements of a given observed sequence, we find that 
such extended sequences are, in point of fact, compatible with any value of 
the limit frequency. If this is so, we might ask why we are entitled in any 
way to assume that the frequency of such an association in even very long 
sequences of observed associations in a population will justify our assertion 
that that frequency will not diverge in further extensive enumerations of 
that sequence. Unless one is prepared to reject extensional empiricism this 
conclusion seems inescapable. Adopting intensionalism and accepting 
the existence of the relevant sort of a priori knowledge, like Russell 
ultimately did (1912 and 1948), permits induction to be grounded in 
a robust essentialism and a form of rationalism that allows for synthetic 
a priori knowledge of universals. But, although Reichenbach himself 
endorsed such a view in his early thinking about this problem in his 
dissertation, in his later work he staunchly opposed this sort of view and 
the idea of a priori knowledge, claiming that, “The idea that there is such 
a thing as a ‘rational belief’ is the root of all evil in the theory of knowledge 
and is nothing but a remnant from rationalistic philosophies (Reichenbach, 
1949d).” 
In any case, Reichenbach saw that his understanding of this problem in 
terms of frequentism was just the classical problem of induction  
in a somewhat new guise, and he showed two things. First, he showed that, 
by definition, if such a limit exists, then the procedure of scientific 
induction will be successful, and, second, that scientific induction is at least 
as good as any other method in discovering what is really the case 
concerning the frequency of an association in a sequence. Reichenbach 
explains, 
Let us assume for the moment that there is a limit towards which the sequence 
converges, then there must be an n from which on our posit [the rule of induction] 
leads to the correct result; this follows from the definition of the limit, which 
requires that there be an n from which on the frequency remains within a given 
interval . If we were to adopt, on the contrary, the principle of always positing 
a limit outside f n   when a frequency f n has been observed, such a procedure 
would certainly lead us to a false result from a certain n on. This does not mean that 
there could not be other principles which like the first [the rule of induction] would 
lead to the correct limit. But we can make the following statement about these 
principles: even if they determine the posit outside f n   for a smaller n, they must, 
                                               
12 Sequences with convergent limiting frequencies are just those sequences that 
settle into stable frequencies in the limit. 
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from a certain n on, determine the posit within f n  . All other principles of 
positing must converge asymptotically with the first [the rule of induction] 
(Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 316). 
What he showed was that if a limit exists for a sequence, then by repeated 
application the rule of induction will lead to the value of that limit to any 
desired degree of approximation in a finite number of applications, and that 
all other methods will asymptotically converge with the results of the rule 
of induction. So, in spite of the fact that we cannot know that the limiting 
frequencies of sequences exist, we might as well simply accept the rule of 
induction because it is the best method of all methods. All methods are, in 
a sense, parasitic on the rule of induction. Again, this pragmatic answer to 
the problem of induction arose directly out of Reichenbach’s recognition 
that, in point of fact, we cannot know that such limits exist in our world. We 
cannot know whether such convergent limits exist based on the empirical 
observation of associations in finite, extensionally given, sequences. So, we 
are stuck in the situation that either no method at all works, or induction is 
the best of all methods. In terms of the sophisticated Reichanbach argument 
this can be expressed as follows. If worlds are extensional and there is no a 
priori knowledge of the regularity of the world, then we cannot know 
the real value of m(wa). Nevertheless, it will be true that if 1  m(wa) > , 
then scientific induction will be successful. If this is not the case, then no 
method will be successful. 
3. Posits and Pragmatic Justifications 
Even so, Reichenbach tells us that we can treat the existence of such limits 
of relative frequencies as posits, where posits are not to be treated as beliefs 
in the normal sense, but rather as a kind of wager concerning what would be 
most advantageous to us. Reichenbach explains that, 
It is evidently the concept of posit which we have to employ for an explanation of 
this method. If in the finite section given we have observed a certain frequency  
f n, we posit that sequence, on further continuation, will converge towards the limit f 
n (more precisely: within the interval f n  δ). We posit this; we do not say that 
it is true, we only posit it in the same sense as the gambler lays a wager on the horse 
which he believes to be fastest. We perform an action which appears to us the most 
favorable one, without knowing anything about the success of this individual action 
(Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 315). 
Furthermore, as all other rules are parasitic on the rule of induction, it is 
only natural to lay our wager on that rule. We are wagering that 
1  m(wa) > So, the sort of justification his argument provides is clearly a 
matter of pragmatics. It is, as Feigl claimed, a justification actionis.13 But, 
                                               
13 See Feigl (1963). 
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in any case, the kind of wager involved in positing the existence of 
convergent limits in infinite sequences is not the typical kind of wager that 
a gambler makes. Normally, a gambler at least knows the odds with which 
he is confronted and so can make an informed decision about what outcome 
to bet on (i.e. which is the best bet), but in the case of the limits of infinite 
sequences we are making the posit that the limit converges to f n blindly; 
i.e. we are making this posit when we do not know the odds, and so we do 
not know if it is the best posit.  
Reichenbach claims that in such cases we are making what he calls 
an approximative posit concerning the existence of such limits. We are 
blindly wagering that 1  m(wa) > . As we have seen, Reichenbach shows 
that if we are right about the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is 
correct), then induction will be successful, and if any other method is 
successful, then scientific induction will be successful. If we are wrong 
about the existence of such a limit (if this blind wager is not correct), then if 
any other method is successful, then scientific induction will be successful 
in this more restricted sense. Therefore, scientific induction is at least 
optimal in this specific sense. However, as BonJour notes in the passage 
quoted in section 1, this by no means shows that induction is justified in 
the traditional sense, and Reichenbach’s view is apparently compatible with 
radical skepticism concerning the probity of induction. It may simply be 
false that 1  m(wa) >  and, given extensional empiricism, we cannot know 
whether this claim is true or false. So, as far as we know, the method of 
induction might well be the best of a bad lot. Nonetheless, Reichenbach 
argues that there is a sense in which his argument vindicates induction if 
one is committed to extensional empiricism. It does show that if any 
method works, then induction works. We do not know that the rule is 
unreliable, but we know that it is the best method if any method is reliable. 
So, why not commit ourselves to the use of scientific induction? Of course, 
this may not be a satisfactory justification for someone who has sympathies 
with BonJour’s inductive skeptic, but it is clearly to our practical advantage 
if scientific induction turns out to be reliable. As Reichenbach sees it, 
the alternative is to give up on science altogether. More importantly for 
the purposes of this discussion, what this result really establishes is that 
given extensional empiricism induction can only be pragmatically justified 
in the sense of Reichenbach’s vindication. But how? Reichenbach is not 
terribly clear on this point, but this lacuna can be fixed easily by appeal to 
the decision-theoretic maximin rule. 
4. The Maximin Justification of Reichenbach’s Rule 
After presenting his account of the optimality of the inductive rule, 
Reichenbach discusses the sense in which using this rule can be justified in 
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light of the problems associated with our ignorance of the existence of 
the convergent limit sequences that are required for the success of 
induction. As we have already seen, he says of the inductive rule that, 
We posit this; we do not say that it is true, we only posit it in the same sense as 
the gambler lays a wager on the horse which he believes to be fastest. We perform 
an action which appears to us the most favorable one, without knowing anything 
about the success of this individual action (Reichenbach, 1949b, p. 315). 
Elsewhere he also says: 
Inductive positing in the sense of a trial-and-error method is justified so long as it is 
not known that the attempt is hopeless, that there is no limit of the frequency. 
Should we have no success, the positing was useless; but why not take our chance? 
The phrase “take our chance” is not meant to state that there is a certain 
probability of success; it means only that there is a possibility of success in 
the sense that there is no proof that success is excluded (Reichenbach, 1949c, p. 49). 
Finally, he explains to Russell in his 1949 letter that, 
I have shown that blind posits are justified as a means to an end, and that no kind of 
belief in their truth is required. This I regard as an essential merit of my theory: 
I have shown that there are other reasons to make assertions than reasons based on 
belief (Reichenbach, 1949d, p. 407). 
So, these remarks show that Reichenbach is clearly asserting that there are 
alternative justifications that have to do with non-epistemic pragmatic 
considerations and we know only that the probability that there are limit 
frequencies is non-zero. But, he also tells us in his 1949 letter that, 
…the inductive conclusion can be called probable only when many other inductions 
have already been made, which tells us something about the second level 
probabilities. I speak here of the stage of advanced knowledge. In primitive 
knowledge, i.e. before any inductions were made, the inductive conclusion is not 
probable (Reichenbach, 1949d, p. 409). 
So, in point of fact, Reichenbach believes that it is only when we have 
begun to make inductive inferences that we can even claim that 
the conclusions of inductive inferences are probable, and this is based on 
the success of making such inductions. Thus, the second-order probability 
of the inductive rule itself is very low in the state of primitive knowledge, 
for we have not therein yet made first-order inductions sufficient to gauge 
the second-order probability of induction. Prior to this state of advanced 
knowledge, inductive conclusions are not probable and can only be justified 
pragmatically in the sense of blind positing. Notice that this will be true for 
any alternative inductive rule as well. So, the rationality of induction writ 
large and independent of the selection of one of the possible reliable 
inductive rules depends on their being a vindication of the inductive rule in 
this primitive state. Even if there are other rules that are superior to 
Reichenbach’s inductive rule in terms of how often they get correct results, 
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this can only be determined in the state of advanced knowledge. All of this 
then suggests that Reichenbach’s rather vague appeal to pragmatic 
justification can be made much more coherent by appealing to some 
particular resources in modern decision theory and focusing on justifying 
induction in the primitive state of knowledge. 
In decision situations where probabilities cannot be meaningfully 
assigned to outcomes (other than that they are non-zero) advice about what 
to do is wholly a function of utilities, because no expected utilities can be 
calculated for such cases. There are then two ways one might provide such 
a pragmatic justification for adopting the inductive rule. First, in such cases 
and where the potential losses are great Wald’s maximin rule usefully 
applies: 
(MR) maximize the minimum utility outcome.14  
Reichenbach’s approximative posit fits this bill perfectly. Much is at stake 
here. If scientific induction does not work, then our inductive inferences 
cannot possibly succeed and we would have to give up on science. 
Moreover, as Reichenbach admits, we have no idea of the probabilities on 
which this wager is based. So, where R is ‘1  m(wa) > ’, I is ‘employ 
scientific induction’, S is ‘assured success in inductive reasoning in the long 
run’, P is ‘possible success in the long run’, Reichenbach’s wager can be 
fruitfully understood as follows:15 
 
                                R                               R 
 
  I                                          S                                S 
 
 I                                         P                                                    S 
 
 
                                               
14 See Wald (1939, 1945) and Resnik (1987, pp. 26-27). 
15 Since we are only considering the primitive state of knowledge here, we need not 
be concerned with the claim that there are alternative rules of induction that are superior 
to Reichenach’s preferred rule in our table. We can simply see that whatever rule in 
particular we adopt as the second-order guide to inductive inference, Reichenbach’s 
considerations show us that the only kind of rational justification for any inductive rule 
(no matter how efficient) in the primitive state is a blind posit of this pragmatic sort. We 
could, in effect, run the very same argument substituting for I any such second-order 
rule. So, the upshot of Reichenbach’s considerations really should be that the only 
justification for induction in the primitive state of knowledge is pragmatic. 
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Here we also have the following relative ordering of utilities: V(S) > V(P) > 
V(S), and this is all the application of the maximin rule requires. We do 
not need to know ordinal utilities to apply MR. MR tells us to look at 
the worst outcomes of the acts given the relevant states of the world. For 
I we get S, for I we also get S. These values are equal. By the lexical 
MR we then look at the next lowest outcome(s) of I and I respectively. In 
the case of I we get S, and for I we get P. So, the MR tells us that it is 
maximally rational to do I even in the primitive state of knowledge where 
inductive conclusions are not probable and where the second-order 
probability that the inductive rule is correct is also very low. 
The second way one might flesh out Reichenbach’s solution is in terms 
of a simple dominance argument based on the dominance principle. Again, 
where we have ignorance of the relevant probabilities we should look at 
the utilities of the outcomes and apply a principle of pragmatic rationality to 
decide what to do. The dominance principle is just such a rule. The familiar 
notion here is that an act A dominates an act B if for every outcome 
the utility of A is equal to or greater than the utility of B and for at least one 
outcome the utility of A is greater than that of B. The dominance principle 
is then this: 
(DOM) opt for dominant acts. 
Referring back to our decision table we can see that I dominates I even in 
the primitive state of knowledge where inductive conclusions and the 
second-order probability that induction is correct is very low. Nevertheless, 
DOM tells us that it is pragmatically rational to opt for I. Thus, 
Rerichenbach’s solution can be pragmatically vindicated, but in a principled 
rather than intuitive manner. It is pragmatically rational to use scientific 
induction and there is nothing at all obscure about why this is so. It is 
pragmatically justified in light of the maximin rule and/or in light of the 
dominance principle, and this is so despite our ignorance of the relevant 
probabilities concerning the existence/non-existence of convergent limits, 
the primitive improbability of inductive conclusions, and the improbability 
of the second-order claim that the inductive rule is correct. 
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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to provide context for and historical exegesis of 
Carnap’s alleged move from syntax to semantics. The Orthodox Received View states 
that there was a radical break, while the Unorthodox Received View holds that 
Carnap’s syntactical period already had many significant semantical elements. I will 
argue that both of them are partly right, both of them contain a kernel of truth: it is true 
that Carnap’s semantical period started after his Logical Syntax of Language — in one 
sense of semantics. But it is also true that Carnap had already included semantical ideas 
in LSL: though not (just) in the sense that URV maintains. This latter sense of 
semantics is related to what is usually called inferentialism, and by getting a clearer 
picture of Carnap’s original aims, context, and concept-usage, we might be in a better 
position to approach his alleged inferentialism. 
1. Introduction: The Scene and the Heroes 
Carnap held many views, though still not as many as Bertrand Russell — 
nonetheless, orthodox views about these changes emerged and stuck around 
during the last quarter of the twentieth century. One of them maintained that 
there was a radical break between Carnap’s syntactical and semantic period, 
the latter being initiated alone by Alfred Tarski. As A. J. Ayer (1982, p. 52) 
said, “Carnap’s eyes were dramatically opened at a congress in Paris in 
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RC XX-YY-ZZ where XX is the box number, YY the folder number, and ZZ the item 
number; the UCLA archive as Carnap 1957, [UCLA] followed by box, folder, and page 
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idiosyncratic and ungrammatical English sentences of Carnap and Neurath’s letters are 
preserved. 
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1935 when Tarski presented an abstract of his semantic theory of truth.” 
This view may be labeled as the Orthodox Received View (ORV) of 
Carnap’s philosophical development. 
It was pointed out recently that this picture is highly oversimplified; 
furthermore, certain parts of it are entirely false. These new developments 
— reaching their peak in the 1990s — seem to be the new orthodoxy, thus 
I will refer to them as the Unorthodox Received View (URV). I will argue 
that both of the received views are partly right, that is, both of them contain 
a kernel of truth: it is true that Carnap’s (1937) semantical period started 
after his Logical Syntax of Language (LSL; originally in German, 1934) — 
in one sense of semantics. But it is also true that Carnap had already 
included semantical ideas in LSL: though not (just) in the sense that URV 
maintains. This latter sense of semantics is related to what is usually called 
inferentialism, and by getting a clearer picture of Carnap’s original aims, 
context, and concept-usage, we might be in a better position to approach his 
alleged inferentialism. 
One more bit of context: recently Jaroslav Peregrin (2014 
and forthcoming) has uncovered the logical side of Carnap’s LSL and its 
relation to contemporary inferentialism. As he (forthcoming) argues, “from 
the current vantage point […] Carnap’s investigations from LSL are much 
more interesting than even the later Carnap himself would have 
appreciated.” The recent paper is not so much about the logical 
technicalities and subtleties of Carnap’s work, but about the historical 
settings: some more context and historical evidence will be provided for 
the recent understanding of Carnap. 
2. The Orthodox Received View 
ORW has stuck around until the late 1980s, though one might still 
encounter it in textbook-type presentations. The main idea behind ORW is 
that Carnap’s characteristic ideas are either flawed, or turned out to be 
wrong. There are four main points that seem to be the core of this view 
and they could be made explicit as follows: 
(A) During the early 1930s, Carnap embraced the approach of ‘logical 
syntax’ that holds that every philosophical problem is a linguistic 
(syntactical) problem, and it deals exclusively with formal structures 
and syntactical categories, without taking into account any type of meaning 
and/or reference. “Philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science,” 
said Carnap (1937, p. xiii), “that is to say, by the logical analysis of 
the concepts and sentences of the sciences, for the logic of science is 
nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of science” (emphasis 
in the original). In the year of the Syntax book, Carnap (1934a, p. 29) even 
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declared that he and his Viennese friends “pursue Logical Analysis, but no 
philosophy” (emphasis in the original). 
(B) The conception presented in Logical Syntax is full of serious 
philosophical and technical mistakes and errors; therefore the approach 
based on logico-syntactical analyses of language gives us a highly defective 
tool: it was doomed to failure. 
(C) There is a radical break in Carnap’s development: he was convinced 
by Alfred Tarski to give up his syntactical approach in favor of semantics 
even before the ink was dry on the Syntax-book. 
(D) Finally, Carnap accepted the semantic method, and quickly worked 
out various semantical systems, using such notions as ‘truth’, ‘truth-
condition’, ‘reference’, ‘denotation.’ 
The Orthodox Received View was eagerly defended and propagated, 
from different perspectives, by A. J. Ayer (1982), Max Black (1945, 
p. 172), Ernest Nagel (1942, p. 469), Maria Kokoszyńska (1936 and 1939, 
p. 118) and Otto Neurath. Some of them thought that Carnap was guilty of 
accepting semantics despite its obvious unempiricist and metaphysical 
underpinnings and/or implications. For example, Black (1945, p. 172) said 
that “[i]t comes as something of a shock […] to find these new studies 
re-admitting wholesale those ostensible referents of symbolism which had 
seemed to have been permanently banished from ‘scientific philosophy’ [in 
LSL].” The American logical empiricist Ernest Nagel (1935, p. 357) also 
admired LSL, and thus raised in his review of Introduction to Semantics 
two important problems: first, it seemed that Carnap’s approach to 
designation leads to unnecessary and problematic metaphysical 
hypostatization, and secondly that “it appears doubtful […] whether 
a semantics which deliberately abstracts from all reference to the users of 
a language has much to contribute to the resolution of general philosophical 
issues” (Nagel, 1942, p. 472). 
Even before Nagel’s review of the book, Carnap was aware of his 
dismissal of the new semantical project. In Introduction to Semantics (1942, 
p. xi), Carnap stated that “while many philosophers today urge 
the construction of a system of semantics, others, especially among my 
fellow empiricists, are rather skeptical.” In the Neurath-Carnap 
correspondence, this is explained as follows: “When I wrote about fellow 
empiricists making objections against Semantics (in the Preface of vol. I) 
I was, of course, thinking in the first place of you and Nagel.”1 Carnap, as 
he claimed in the same letter, did not name or quote them because they did 
not publish anything that was explicitly against semantics. 
Nagel planned, however, to publish a paper on Charles S. Peirce 
around 1939: he aimed to attacked Carnap’s way of pursuing semantics, but 
                                                             
1 Carnap to Neurath, May 11, 1943 (RC 102-55-01). 
60 Adam Tamas Tuboly 
 
 
it did not appear since The Journal of Unified Science (the follow-up of 
Erkenntnis) was cancelled during the war.2 Nonetheless, since the paper 
was read at the 1939 International Congress for the Unity of Science (at 
Harvard), Carnap was aware of its content. Nagel (1939/1954, p. 96) 
emphasized Peirce’s behavioristic treatment of language: “neither terms nor 
statements can be regarded as designating, independently of the habits 
involved in their use” (emphasis in the original). Besides reconstructing 
Peirce’s philosophy, Nagel accepted and recommended it with regard to 
the newly emerged semantics of Carnap as well; there is a long passage 
about how Nagel incorporated his fears into the narrative of the history of 
logical empiricism, and since it is quite unknown, I will quote it at full 
length: 
Some have suspected, perhaps unjustly, that the recently inaugurated discipline of 
semantics will open wide the door for the rehabilitation of Bolzano’s Saetze-an-
Sich, Meinong’s objectives, Russell’s subsistens, and allied conceptions of the 
referends of signs. Though such doctrines have had fruitful historical roles, I think it 
would be a retrograde step if modern logical empiricism were to revive them in 
a new form; for the greater strength and promise of the movement has been its 
interpretation of the abstract in terms of the concrete, and its resolute turning from 
speculations which have no ascertainable consequences in issues of observable fact. 
(Nagel, 1939/1954, p. 96. Emphases in the original.) 
Carnap (1942, pp. xi-xii) indeed knew about these fears and was inclined to 
dissolve them. He even referred to Nagel’s talk implicitly: friends of 
the movement, he said, “are afraid that a discussion of propositions […] 
and truth […] will open the back door to speculative metaphysics, which 
was put out at the front door.” 
In January 1950, Carnap wrote a letter to his friend Franz Roh, an art 
historian from Munich: in that letter he happily accepted Roh’s 
‘psychological and sociological explanation of misunderstandings’ 
and used examples from his own life to confirm the narrative about how his 
old friends tried to save him from the new changes and conversions. 
“[Take] for example my transition from the period of my ‘Logischen 
Syntax der Sprache’ to the later semantical period to which my latest books 
belong,” wrote Carnap to Roh, “[…] my friends always came and said, ‘But 
you have put everything such a good way; you cannot suddenly overthrow 
everything!’”3 Because so many of his friends were criticizing him for 
the propagation of semantics and they did not understand that it was a 
practical decision and not a theoretical question, he wrote up a paper to 
explain his stance: it was “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (ibid.). 
                                                             
2 Nagel’s paper was published later in his selected essays: Sovereign Reason and 
Other Studies in the Philosophy of Science; see Nagel (1939/1954). 
3 Carnap to Franz Roh, January 14, 1950 (RC 102-34-06). 
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Thus the targets of Carnap’s famous paper were Nagel and Neurath, and not 
just the usual suspect W.V.O. Quine. 
Though the above passage might be seen as a digression, actually it 
documents well Carnap’s basic attitude towards philosophy and his friends: 
make everything as clear as it can be and do not let misunderstanding 
influence your judgment and make you look for theoretical gaps and clashes 
when only practical matters surface. The question of the nature and status of 
semantics was for Carnap such a milestone that it deserved much more 
attention.  
From the Nagel-Neurath pair, the latter presented a more difficult case: 
it was quite difficult to untangle Neurath’s arguments against semantics, as 
they amalgamated the requirement of clarity for empirical languages, 
a vehement anti-metaphysical attitude, and certain considerations against 
non-pluralistic (totalitarian) tendencies in science and especially in politics. 
While LSL was Neurath’s “logical Bible,”4 Introduction to Semantics 
presented just “all the Aristotelian metaphysics in full glint and glamour,” 
and the same absolutist attitude that might be found (at least Neurath 
detected it) behind all those searches for the real, one world, for the only 
Truth that characterized the entire tradition from Plato, through Descartes 
and Kant, to German idealism and finally to fascism and Nazism.5 
Others, mainly the Polish logicians, maintained that the earlier Carnap 
was a bad guy. Perhaps due to either being under the wrong influences, 
or working in a sort of isolation, Carnap promoted mistaken and false ideas 
in his syntactical phase, and it took “a Tarski” to enter the picture and 
single-handedly transform him into an advocate of semantics. This 
narrative, though it is diametrically opposed to Neurath’s and Nagel’s story, 
provided its own ‘radical break’ point in Carnap’s philosophical and 
intellectual development. 
Be as it may — I am not here to judge which Carnap was “the true and 
right Carnap” — both groups (and sometimes even Carnap!) claimed 
explicitly or implicitly that there was a break in his intellectual 
development, centered on the idea of semantics, initiated by Polish 
logicians, or by one particular logician, namely Tarski. 
3. The Unorthodox Received View 
                                                             
4 Neurath to Carnap, November 25, 1934 (RC 029-10-07). 
5 Neurath to Carnap, January 15, 1943 (RC 102-55-02). On semantics and politics 
see Neurath to Carnap, September 15, 1943 (RC 102-55-03), this letter contains 
the term “Plato-Hitler”) and September 22, 1945 (RC 115-07-66, unsent). Cf. Reisch, 
2005. 
62 Adam Tamas Tuboly 
 
 
Beginning with the works of Alberto Coffa (1976; 1991), Thomas Ricketts 
(1996), Stewe Awodey (2007), and Richard Creath (1990a; 1996; 1999), 
a new understanding of Carnap emerged. Creath (1996, p. 251) argued that 
“for the most part, […] Carnap’s syntax is really semantics or at least that 
the difference between what Carnap provides and a full-blown semantics 
would be infinitesimal were there infinitesimals.” Their points were 
the following: 
(1*) Even though Carnap argued for a syntactical conception of 
language, logic, and philosophy, his project involved many elements 
and techniques which later came to be called semantics. Creath summarized 
(1990a, p. 410) this as follows: “Not only is the logical consequence 
relation itself semantical, as we use the term, but so are truth tables, 
interpretation, and analyticity, all of which Carnap discusses. The treatment, 
especially of the last of these, is surprisingly close to a full semantical 
account.” Even Tarski noted in his “On the Concept of Logical 
Consequence” (1936/1956, p. 413) and in the “Historical Notes” for 
“The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” (1935/1956, pp. 277-
278) that Carnap achieved very similar results via very similar methods 
regarding truth and semantics. 
(2*) Carnap’s main metaphilosophical commitments (conventionalism, 
holism, or in Creath’s terms, functionalism) remained intact in the alleged 
change of views, indicating that his radical break was not that radical. 
Carnap suggested a pragmatic approach to logic, syntax, and semantics in 
his later works, as well as in his famous principle of tolerance in LSL 
(1937, §17). He claimed that semantics is to be regarded as a tool that is 
used to structure and systematize knowledge, and its use should be decided 
by its expedience (Carnap, 1950/1956, p. 221). It would be important to 
mention that there were scholars already in 1942, who claimed that — from 
a general point of view — “the continuity with Carnap’s previous thinking 
is evident from the beginning” since he ignores “psychologistic pseudo-
problems” (J.M.R., 1942, p. 282).6 
(3*) Therefore, given the metaphilosophical continuation 
and the presence of semantical-technical matters in LSL, the Unorthodox 
Received View holds that the change between Carnap’s syntactical 
and semantical period is a relatively small one, and not a radical break. 
                                                             
6 Actually, Carus (1999) claimed that there isn’t any radical break between 
the syntactical and the semantical Carnap — or at least surely not in the sense of ORV 
— since all those conceptions, like theories of truth, coherence, correspondence, that 
are used by ORV to mark the gaps in Carnap’s thinking were rejected by Carnap 
entirely. 
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Ricketts (1996, p. 231) even claimed, “the step is so small that we should 
ask why Carnap needed the impetus of Tarski’s work to take it.”7 
I tagged this approach as “Unorthodox Received View” because even 
though the aforementioned scholars made many new, important, 
and revealing discoveries and remarks, calling our attention to a much more 
interesting picture and context of Carnap’s work, their views have 
apparently become the new orthodoxy. Nevertheless, there is still much 
more to Carnap’s syntactical and semantical period, and using a bit more 
context and materials, we might be able to show (at least as a first 
approximation) that we still have to refine our new Carnap-picture. 
4. A Timeline: From ‘Metalogik’, through ‘Semantik’, to 
‘Syntax’ 
In this section, in order to solve some conceptual issues and to see how 
Carnap’s systems and ideas evolved, I will discuss three notions that he 
used frequently in the early 1930s, namely ‘Metalogik,’ ‘Semantik’ 
and ‘Syntax.’ 
When dealing with the Wittgensteinian problem of how to account for 
and talk about language, Carnap (1963, pp. 53-54) had a famous “sleepless 
night” in January 1931, when he formulated his new project: “Versuch eine 
Metalogik,” i.e. “Attempt at a Metalogic.” In his first Vienna Circle lectures 
on metalogic, delivered in June, he defined the notion as “the theory of 
the forms which appear in a language, thus the representation of the syntax 
of language. In it one must not — to follow the formulation of the Warsaw 
group — make reference [Bezug] to the meanings [Bedeutung] of 
the signs” (Stadler, 2001/2015, p. 107).8 
Thus “Metalogik” captured Carnap’s intention: he wanted to talk about 
language without considering the various non-verbal elements; however, 
since language is determined by logic, the first step was to talk about logic, 
to work out a metalogical framework. During 1931, Carnap was thinking 
about his new project under the title and category of “Metalogik.” This 
might be seen also in his famous “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through 
Logical Analysis of Language” paper: he talks there about the 
“metalogical” formulations of language (1932/1959, p. 62). By the time of 
                                                             
7 It should be mentioned that Tarski did not ‘open Carnap’s eye dramatically’ in 
1935, since it is known that Carnap invited Tarski to Paris, and that he was involved in 
the German translation of Tarski’s 1933 truth paper. On this, see Gruber (2016) 
and Woleński (2017). 
8 Carnap’s three lectures on metalogic, introducing his new ideas to the Circle, have 
been translated and published in Stadler (2001/2015, pp. 107-111 (first lecture), 
pp. 111-116 (second lecture), pp. 116-123 (third lecture and discussion)). 
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the publication of this paper, Carnap wrote from Prague to Schlick that “of 
my ‘Metalogic’, the main part is done.”9 
Even though the title of the manuscript was still “Metalogik — Die 
logische Syntax der Sprache” in 1932, important changes were lurking 
around. He reported to Schlick in June that he “accepted the suggestion of 
Gödel and Behmann to replace ‘Metalogic’ with the word ‘Semantics.’”10 
It is known from Carnap’s correspondence that he asked Gödel (January 1) 
to read the manuscript and make a “few critical remarks.”11 Gödel was 
interested and Carnap sent him via Hempel the “Metalogik” manuscript 
(February 23, 1932; Gödel, 2003, p. 343). Their letters dealt with Carnap’s 
definition of “analyticity,” but nothing was said about Syntax/Semantics, 
only Carnap’s diaries testify that Gödel suggested the term “Semantik”; 
actually it happened on the same day when Neurath proposed “Universal 
Syntax, logical foundations of Unified Science” (“Universelle Syntax, 
logische Grundlagen der Einheitswissenschaft”) as a new title to emphasize 
connections to the movement.12 
To see why Gödel might have suggested the term “Semantik,” another 
player shall enter the scene now. The German mathematician and logician 
Heinrich Behmann also got the manuscript before January 1932: that time 
Carnap asked him terminological questions, for example, about the title: “Is 
‘Metalogic’ good? or is ‘logical’ Syntax better?”13 Behmann read 
the manuscript, made many technical remarks that will not concern us here, 
and responded to Carnap’s title-questions. Interestingly, Behmann indicated 
that, the problem was more than just a terminological issue. He claimed on 
March 23 that “metalogic” is too narrow a term, since what captures 
Carnap’s intentions is not an investigation about logic, as the term would 
suggest, but about language, so analogously a term like “Meta-Sprache,” 
“Meta-language” would be a better fit.14 However, three days later (March 
26), Behmann added some notes to the same letter; he came up with a new 
and better suggestion: what actually captures Carnap’s new project is 
“’Semantics, as ‘the study of representation [Darstellung] through signs’” 
(ibid.). 
The term “Semantik” stuck with Carnap: in the two lectures that he 
prepared for Hans Reichenbach’s Berlin-colloquium in July 1932, he talked 
about the “Formal Questions of Semantics” and “Semantics as the 
                                                             
9 Carnap to Schlick, December 7, 1931 (RC 029-029-15). 
10 Carnap to Schlick, June 30, 1932 (RC 029-029-11). 
11 Carnap to Gödel, January 1, 1932 (RC 115-08-06). 
12 Carnap’s diary entry and margin note, March 26, 1932 (RC 025-75-10). 
13 Carnap to Behmann, January 20, 1932 (RC 115-10-16). 
14 Behmann to Carnap, March 21, 1932 (RC 115-10-18). 
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Foundation of Scientific Philosophy.”15 In the second lecture, we read the 
following: 
What is semantics? Hilbert’s metamathematics or proof-theory [Beweistheorie]: 
signs as objects = semantics of mathematical systems of formulas. 
 Semantics = theory of forms of the complete language [Formtheorie der 
Gesamtsprache], combinatorics of the sign-complexes, without reference 
[Bezugnahme] to the referents [Bedeutung] of signs! (Like chess). Calculus. 
 2 parts: 1) Syntax, 2) theory of deduction [Schlusslehre] […] 
Thesis: Scientific Philosophy is Semantics. […] 
[…] 
2) Philosophy handles the language-forms, without reference to the referents! 
Example: Consequence-relation [Folgebeziehung], the most important concept of 
Semantics. (RC110-07-23, p. 1. Underlining in the original.) 
Even though Carnap crossed “Semantik” in the titles and wrote “Syntax” 
everywhere, there was apparently a point when he was more than positive 
about semantics: it was just the foundation of scientific philosophy! This 
period, however, might be characterized as “oscillation”: in the reply to his 
fellow Vienna Circle member Edgar Zilsel and to the Gestalt psychologist 
Karl Duncker, written mainly during the summer of 1932, Carnap (1932, 
p. 177) mentioned semantics, logical syntax, and metalogic at the same 
time, since all of them study the structure of sentences of a given language. 
At this time ‘metalogic’ was the least favored term and Carnap was 
caught between ‘syntax’ and ‘semantics.’ In April 1932, he replied to 
Behmann’s letter as follows: “I like the term ‘semantics’; Gödel also 
suggested it. Neurath, on the other hand, thinks it is unappealing and 
pedantic; he suggests ‘syntax.’ In order to avoid confusion with syntax in 
philology, one would probably often have to call it ‘logical syntax.’”16 He 
wrote the same to Schlick: “I replaced the word ‘metalogic’ with 
‘semantics’, accepting Gödel’s and Behmann’s suggestion.”17 Furthermore, 
in the table of contents, written for an earlier version of the Syntax book, 
Carnap had the following handwritten note at the title (which was at that 
time “Metalogik: Die logische Syntax der Sprache”): “Later ‘metalogic’ 
was replaced by ‘semantics’, but since Neurath rejected the word 
‘semantics’, I kept ‘syntax’” (RC 110-04-07, p.1). 
Nevertheless, until the end of 1932, Carnap referred to his manuscript 
(almost) always as ‘Semantik’ in his diaries. Though in February 1933 he 
                                                             
15 “Formale Fragen der Semantik Syntax (Für Vortrag in Reichenbachs Seminar, 
Berlin, 1.7.32.” (RC 110-07-20); and “Die Semantik Syntax als Grundlage der 
wissenschaftlichen Philosophie. Referat in Reichenbachs Kolloquium, Berlin, 4.7.32.” 
(RC 110-07-23). 
16 Carnap to Behmann, April 17, 1932 (RC 115-10-19). 
17 Carnap to Schlick, June 30, 1932 (RC 029-29-11). 
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wrote to Quine that during his “Logik II” course in Prague he “will discuss 
[the] new research on logical syntax (metalogic, semantics),”18 the primary 
category of identification became ‘syntax’ after that spring. Actually, when 
Carnap delivered a talk at the meeting of the Vienna Circle (July 10, 1933), 
he talked only about syntax and argued that “(philosophy =) logic of 
science = Syntax” (RC 110-07-22). After these lectures — where Carnap 
presented the famous “principle of tolerance” for the very first time — the 
main ideas of LSL were settled just as we know them today. 
Before I move on, one more thing should be mentioned. In his 
intellectual autobiography, Carnap (1963, p. 54) remembered the discussed 
changes as follows: “At that time I defined the term ‘metalogic’ as the 
theory of the forms of the expressions of a language. Later I used the term 
‘syntax’ instead of ‘metalogic’ […].” ‘Semantics’ is obviously and notably 
missing from these remarks — thus vindicating the narrative of ORW. The 
original and unpublished autobiography, however, is a bit different: “At that 
time I defined the term ‘metalogic’ as ‘the theory of the forms of 
the expressions of a language, that is, the description of the syntax of 
language’ […]. Later I used instead of ‘metalogic’ the term ‘semantics’; but 
I soon abandoned it in favor of ‘syntax’ […].”19 Thus vindicating URV. It 
would be interesting to hypostasize about why Carnap deleted that clause, 
but that may lead too far into the history of American philosophy of science 
and language. 
What conclusions shall we draw? (1) Though Carnap had various names 
for his project, all of them captured something. ‘Metalogik’ captured 
the idea that language is to be accounted and approached from a logical 
point of view. ‘Semantik’ was apt because it was connected to the idea (as 
we will see in the following sections) that Carnap wanted to talk about 
meaning and content, and these were semantical notions. Finally, ‘Syntax’ 
captured the idea that philosophy deals only with structures, formal rules 
and not extra linguistic entities. The different names thus documented 
the changes and development of Carnap’s perspectives and emphases. 
5. “Semantik” in the 1920s and 1930s 
Around the fin-de-siècle and shortly after, many words and concepts were 
in use to mark the studies of language, meaning, and reference: 
semasiology, rhematic, sematology, glossology, comparative ideology, 
sensifics, significs, rhematology, semiotic, semiology, orthology, 
and science of idiom (Read, 1948; Burgess, 2008 and ms.; Woleński, 1999). 
                                                             
18 Carnap to Quine, February 6, 1933; quoted from Creath (1990b, p. 109). 
19 Carnap, Rudolf 1957 [UCLA]: “Autobiography. Part Two. Philosophical 
Problems.” Box 2, CM3: M-A4. 
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The application of some of these became regular only in the second half of 
the 19th century and they covered the investigations of the historical 
changes of word-meaning as an extension of the etymological method, 
or the method of dealing with sentences and how they function as signs in 
communication. So the study of language had many forms and various 
conceptions in actual usage, but none of them formed a detailed research 
program or a discipline among philosophers in continental Europe. 
“Semantik” and closely related terms came to be used widely only 
relatively late in the 1920s, mainly by Polish logicians and philosophers. As 
Jan Woleński (1999 and 2009) pointed out, there were two main trends in 
the Lvov-Warsaw School. One of them originated from and was influenced 
by the works of Kazimierz Twardowski, a pupil of Franz Brentano. Among 
his most important students and colleagues, we find Jan Łukasiewicz, 
Stanisław Leśniewski, and Tarski himself. All of them understood 
semantics as a study of the word-world relation: “[P]olish philosophers, 
influenced by Brentano via Twardowski,” said Woleński (2009, p. 52), 
“transformed the intentional conception of mental acts into a referential 
treatment of language.” Interestingly, Neurath wrote the following to 
Carnap in January 1943: 
Scholasticism created Brentanotism, Brentano beget Twardowski, Twardowski 
beget Kotarbinski, Lukasiewicz (you know his direct relations to the Neo-
Scholasticism in Poland), both together beget now TARSKI etc and now they are 
God fathers of OUR Carnap too, in this way THOMAS AQUINAS enters from 
another door Chicago, where he entered already via [Mortimer] ADLER. (Neurath 
to Carnap, January 15, 1943. RC 105-55-02.) 
For Neurath, this line of heritage represented such a grandiose metaphysical 
inheritance that it threatened logical empiricism with pseudo-scientific 
system building. He expressed his fears in the context of semantics and 
the new correspondence-like theory of truth claiming that a new 
“METAPHYSICA MODO LOGISTICA DEMONSTRATA,” that is, a new 
metaphysics, based on strict logic, is hanging over the movement’s head, 
threatening even its elementary integrity. But that is another story.20 
The referential treatment of language is clearly seen in Tarski’s ideas: 
for him, the semantic method involved such concepts as denotation, 
satisfaction, definition, and truth. Most of these items were simply 
neglected at the time by those English and French-speaking scholars who 
tagged their projects with the above-mentioned categories of semantics. 
John Burgess (ms.) even claimed that “Tarski could have called what he 
actually calls ‘semantic’ notions ‘referential’ notions instead.” It is quite 
interesting that he excluded almost all talk of meanings from his semantics. 
                                                             
20 See Neurath to Carnap, July 1, 1936 (RC 102-52-23) and April 30, 1935 (RC 
029-09-57). 
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One cannot find the term synonym, homonym, or ambiguity in Tarski, notes 
Burgess, “which surely would all have been near the top of a list of typical 
‘semantic’ notions for [Michel] Bréal,” who was the father of semantics 
with his lectures and book at the end of the 19th century. 
In 1945, the famous lexicographer and scholar of English slang, Eric 
Partridge complained on the pages of the Journal of the Royal Society of 
Arts that the concept of semantics, developed by Bréal and others was  
[…] not good enough for Professor Carnap and his Polish, Austrian 
and American fellow logicians. They must adopt it, as though no other 
designation could have been found to suit their non-philological, their 
psychological, especially their logistical (rather than logical) purposes, and 
adapt it to their non-linguistic ends. For them, the word [semantics] means 
something quite different from the denotation intended and explained by Bréal, 
Jespersen, and all other true philologists. (Partridge, 1945, p. 455.) 
So, obviously, not everybody was happy with the transformation of the old 
science of semantics — studying communication, information-production, 
signifying etc. — into the formal, mathematical and logical study of 
an abstract word-world relation. Carnap even noted in his unpublished 
autobiography that after the first 1935 Paris congress a reporter wrote about 
Tarski’s lecture as follows: “A learned philosopher came all the way from 
Warsaw to Paris in order to give to us the great revelation that snow is 
white if and only if snow is white.”21 
Let’s stop for a minor and short digression. As can be seen from 
the remarks above, the opinion on logical semantics among professionals 
and laymen varied from acceptance to rejection and incomprehension. 
Another good example is the American economist, social theorist and 
popular writer Stuart Chase who published his Tyranny of Words in 1938. 
Propagating Alfred Korzybski’s theory of semantics, Chase (1938, p. 160) 
mentioned at one point that the University of Chicago Press will publish a 
new encyclopedia under the leadership of Otto Neurath, who “is a kind of 
pioneer in semantics. He believes in going to things wherever possible, 
rather than to words.” Neurath wrote to Carnap that after he moved to 
England, he rebuilt his library, which now included many new books, 
among them items from Stuart Chase.22 It is unknown whether Tyranny of 
Words was among them, or if it was, whether Neurath ever read it carefully 
(though the title might have caught his attention): what is sure, however, is 
that Neurath would never accept that he is a pioneer in semantics, or that he 
believed in going to things and not to words — or at least not without major 
restrictions and qualifications. 
                                                             
21 Carnap 1957 [UCLA], Box 2, CM-3: MA-4, M7-M8. 
22 Neurath to Carnap, July 17, 1942, (RC 102-56-04). 
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Thus it does not seem unreasonable that Carnap did not want to go 
public with the debate concerning semantics. In his opinion, it would not 
have helped their common cause. As he wrote to Neurath, “I think for 
the sake of the movement it would be much better if we were more tolerant 
towards each other. If your intolerance would become the general custom, 
then I am afraid you would be among the first to be declared a heretic 
and excommunicated.”23 The major problem was that they couldn’t even 
agree on what exactly they disagreed about. In Neurath’s narrative they had 
a theoretical debate with some political and social consequences; in 
Carnap’s eyes, however, they had some practical issues and he thought that 
“it would be best for the development of science if the people on the one 
side who see more the turbulent whirl of material in all its colorfulness and 
vagueness, and those on the other side who love nice structural schemata 
would not polemized against each other but rather realize that the work of 
both is necessary for science.”24 Neurath (1941/1983, pp. 221-222; 1944, 
pp. 9-14) did not publish much of his polemics against semantics, and even 
those papers that appeared did not become influential: nonetheless Neurath 
was quite good in building and maintaining relationships, organizing events 
and institutions, so Carnap might have feared that Neurath’s attacks against 
semantics could have influenced the movement behind the curtains. 
Let’s get back to the main line of argument of this paper. Besides 
the Tarski-style, referentially oriented version of semantics, there was 
another line of thought in Poland (Woleński, 2009): namely Leon 
Chwistek’s approach, which was called in 1924 “Semeiotics” and, later, 
“Semantik” in 1932/1933 when his paper appeared in Erkenntnis and when 
Carnap mentioned it in Syntax. Chwistek’s semantics was, however, quite 
different from Tarski’s and from the Twardowski-school: it is best 
compared to Hilbert’s theory of proof, to his formal method, since it 
disregards the relation of a sign to its reference; thus, as Carnap noted in 
LSL (§68), “Chwistek’s system of so-called semantics is, on the whole, 
dedicated to the same task as our syntax” (emphasis in the original). 
Again, what conclusion shall we draw now? Given the various terms 
and ranges of the scientific inquiry about language, meaning, and their 
relation to the extra-linguistic sphere, one shall distinguish two very general 
trends (painted with broad strokes): one type of semantics concerned 
the word-world relation, while the other treated the meaningful component, 
the information, and content-elements, which were conveyed through the 
use of signs. Notably, however, these trends were not always recognized or 
treated separately, or even if they were, the assessment of their value varied 
                                                             
23 Carnap to Neurath, January 29, 1943 (RC 115-07-62). 
24 Carnap to Neurath, February 4, 1944 (RC 102-55-04). 
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quite frequently, not helping the general causes and aims of Carnap and 
other defenders of the new semantical project(s). 
6. Carnap’s usage of the terms 
In order to draw conclusions about Carnap, we have to note whether there is 
any congruence in his and others’ concept usage. As a start, let’s take 
Carnap’s official semantical writings. Both in Foundations of Logic 
and Mathematics (1939) and in Introduction to Semantics (1942), Carnap 
starts from the idea of semiotics as a tripartite inquiry of signs. The three 
levels are well known: pragmatics, semantics, and syntax. Pragmatics deals 
with signs and their users, in semantics we abstract from users and treat 
only the sign-world relation, and finally in syntax the relations of signs to 
signs become the primary target (Carnap, 1942, p. 9). 
This approach, actually, corresponds nicely to Charles Morris’s (1938) 
division of semiotic. But then we face some peculiarities! “With no real 
room for meanings under any label in [Morris’s] system,” says Burgess 
(ms.), “there is naturally no room in his sogenant semantics for anything 
like semantics as it had been conceived before World War I.” Even though 
Morris became one of the main propagators of semantics in the United 
States and in (some parts of) Europe, his semantics was not the one which 
was already established outside of Poland. The same seems to be true for 
the mature Carnap as well, after he adopted Morris’s program. 
More importantly, however, Carnap’s definition of semantics is very 
similar to that of Tarski. In his “The Concept of Truth in Formalized 
Languages,” Polish edition 1933, German 1935, Tarski defined semantics 
as follows: “a characteristic feature of the semantical concepts is that they 
give expression to certain relations between the expressions of language 
and the objects about which these expressions speak” (Tarski, 1935/1956, 
p. 252). Interestingly though, while Carnap and Morris always started their 
discussion with the definition of ‘semantics’, Tarski defined it only at 
a very late point in the last part of his paper, thus somehow indicating that 
‘semantics’ need not be defined (given presumably its well-known 
character). 
Viewing matters from this perspective, it seems to be obvious that 
Carnap was under the philosophical and technical aegis of both Morris’s 
and Tarski’s semantics. It should be kept in mind, however, that there were 
important distinctions between Morris and Tarski. On November 22, 1936, 
Carnap visited Morris and talked with him about the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science and Tarski’s semantics. He noted 
the following in his diaries: “Morris seems to be infected by Neurath’s 
qualms, takes the notions, even my clarifications to be metaphysical, he 
From ’Syntax to ’Semantik’ 71 
 
 
 
wants another — ‘semantics’ (?).”25 Even though Morris fought for 
semantics, he was committed to behaviorism as well: just like Neurath. This 
relation is made explicit in Morris’s controversial Sign, Language, and 
Behavior, where he said that “a science of signs can be most profitably 
developed on a biological basis and specifically within the framework of 
the science of behavior (a field which, following a suggestion of Otto 
Neurath, may be called behavioristics)” (Morris, 1946, p. 1). Note, 
however, that this was a quite typical move among American pragmatists; 
Nagel said in his Harvard lecture that 
I can think of no better way to still these suspicions [about the metaphysical 
underpinning of semantics] than by placing the study of semantics into a behavioral 
context, and by instituting an analysis of such key semantic terms as ‘designation’ 
and ‘truth’ as used in specific contexts, in order to reveal the modes of action they 
signify. (Nagel, 1939/1954, p. 96. Emphasis in the original.) 
So, semantics had the same agenda for Nagel and Morris as for Tarski 
and Carnap, but with different accounting: semantic notions shall be treated 
not as logical, but as behavioral concepts, thus freeing the project from 
actual and/or possible metaphysical components. Seemingly, there was as 
much agreement as disagreement among those who pursued semantics 
under the banner of logical empiricism. 
It is not at all evident, after all, whether it was Morris or Tarski who had 
the most significant influence on Carnap after the mid-1930s. Given that 
Morris (1936) did not use ‘semantics’ or ‘syntax’ in his 1935 lecture at 
the International Congress for the Unity of Science in Paris,26 but used 
instead the concept of ‘existential dimension’ and ‘formal dimension of 
meaning’, and given that Tarski presented his semantical ideas there in 
detail (invited by Carnap to do so), he might have influenced Morris 
somehow. At least Morris seems to have taken ‘semantics’ from Tarski and 
‘syntax’ maybe from Carnap. In his unpublished lecture, entitled “Über den 
semantischen Wahrheitsbegriff” prepared for a discussion with Neurath in 
Paris, 1937, Carnap did not consider the tripartite approach of semiotic (so 
characteristic of Morris), or the peculiar logical ideas of Tarski. He was 
busy with the distinction of truth and confirmation (RC 080-32-01). 
Though the character of Carnap and Neurath’s debate could explain this, it 
still documents Carnap’s interests and concept-usage before his official 
semantical books. 
Note also that although Tarski was a regular figure in Carnap’s 
discussions (he even visited Carnap in Prague), the latter’s famous “Truth 
                                                             
25 Carnap’s diary entry, November 22, 1936 (RC 025-82-01). 
26 The various events at and after the 1935 Paris Congress are described 
and analyzed from the viewpoint of the history of philosophy by Jan Woleński 
(forthcoming). 
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and Confirmation” paper (1949) — presented at the 1935 Paris Congress — 
mentions Tarski only once and doesn’t consider semantics per se, just 
the difference between truth and confirmation. What may cause some 
historical and interpretational trouble is that the 1949 English translation 
(prepared by “H.F.” which stands presumably for “Herbert Feigl”) is 
actually a mixture of the original “Wahrheit und Bewährung” paper and the 
1946 “Remarks on Induction and Truth” paper (written for the discussion 
with Felix Kaufmann at a symposium) which deals in more detail with 
Tarski and semantics in the fashion and emphasis of the 1940s (Kaufmann 
presented Neurath-style arguments against Carnap’s semantics). 
But anyway, what is certain is that Carnap thought that semantics should 
deal with signs, especially linguistic artifacts and their denotation or 
referents in the world. Later, in his posthumously published “Notes on 
Semantics,” Carnap (1972, p. 8) called his semantics “pure, designative 
semantics,” dealing with the “designative meaning component” which is 
“relevant for questions of truth.” 
To move along, we shall ask the question whether this is the semantics 
that is to be found in Carnap’s LSL? Let’s see first what Carnap did not talk 
about. Obviously, he was not dealing with the referents, denotation, or, to 
be more precise, the Bedeutung of expressions — syntax shall abstract from 
these. Since ‘abstracting from the referents’ meant being formal, ‘formal 
semantics’ was just an oxymoron. 
Interestingly, Carnap did not talk about the meaning, that is, the ‘Sinn’ 
of expressions. Or to be more precise, he did not consider meanings to be 
separate, abstract entities in their own right, to be grasped and expressed; 
and he did not take meaning to be such a function or mode of presentation 
that determines the Bedeutung — from this perspective, Frege was not an 
ideal in Syntax. 
What Carnap did talk about is content, or in German, ‘Gehalt’/‘Inhalt’. 
He distinguished two components of expressions, namely 
Sinn/Gehalt/Inhalt and Bedeutung. Regarding their English translations, 
some confusion might arise. ‘Gehalt’ and ‘Inhalt’ is always translated as 
‘content’; ‘Bedeutung’, however, is often rendered as ‘meaning’, but in 
many cases, ‘meaning’ is the word for ‘Sinn’, too. In other cases, ‘Sinn’ is 
just ‘sense’. As a result, often when Carnap speaks about how syntax 
abstracts from ‘meaning’, he means abstracting from ‘Bedeutung’, that is, 
the extra-linguistic element, not from ‘Sinn’, the content or information 
conveyed by expressions. 
Logical syntax does not consider Bedeutung, but what is the case with 
‘Sinn’, ‘Inhalt’ or ‘Gehalt’? Carnap asks whether it is possible to approach 
and define this component from the formal, or syntactical point of view, 
without taking into account the Bedeutung. His account of the content of 
a proposition is quite surprising (from the point of view of ORV, and even 
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URV) and interesting: the content of a proposition is what we can learn 
from it, what it conveys to us, that is, and here is the point, ‘what we can 
deduce from S’, and ‘from what S follows.’ ‘Folgerung’, ‘entailment’, 
‘consequence’ are formal notions in the sense that they do not rely on 
Bedeutung. As Carnap (1934b, p. 11) says in “On the Character of 
Philosophic Problems” (written for the first issue of Philosophy of Science), 
“the question, whether a certain proposition is an inference [Folgerung] of 
certain other propositions or not, is therefore completely analogous to 
the question whether a certain position in chess can be played from another 
or not.” Since content or Sinn is definable by Folgerung or consequence, it 
is also a formal notion. Actually, this is the main tenet of so-called 
inferentialism, as Jaroslav Peregrin (2014 and forthcoming) stated recently: 
the meaning of (logical and non-logical) expressions is exhausted by their 
inferential roles. 
By the content of a sentence S Carnap meant the class of non-valid 
consequences of S, or the non-analytic consequences of S. Part 4 of 
Semantik’s original manuscript contained a section entitled ‘Theory of the 
Content of Formulas’ with such subsections as ‘The General Theory of 
Contents’, ‘Logical Content’, ‘Physicalistic Content’, ‘Empiristic Content,’ 
and so on, but more importantly, its last section was: “Sinn = theoretischer 
Gehalt” (RC 110-04-07/p.3. IV/B/1-2). In fact, when he refers to his new 
“Attempt” manuscript in the “Overcoming Metaphysics” paper, Carnap 
(1932/1959, p. 62) says that “it is planned to give elsewhere a detailed 
exposition of metalogic as the theory of syntax and meaning [Sinnes], i.e. 
relations of deducibility [Ableitungsbeziehung].” This happened, after all, 
in the Syntax book, though under different names. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper was to show that defenders of ORV and URV are 
both right in a sense: Carnap indeed had a radical break in the mid-1930s, 
after the publication of his Logical Syntax of Language. What surfaces in 
his later semantical writings — the semantical concept of truth, based on 
denotation, reference, satisfaction etc. — is missing from LSL. But it must 
be admitted as well that Carnap already had some semantical insights in the 
context of the syntax project. These were partly connected to his later works 
(as it was emphasized by URV), but mainly they constituted semantics in 
a different sense: namely, as semantics dealing with content, information 
and with the ‘Sinn’ of expressions. Referentially conceived semantics as 
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a research project was pursued only later, and it is a further question 
whether Tarski or Morris represented the major line for Carnap.27 
Semantics for Carnap, in the early 1930s, was very similar to what later 
became called inferentialism, so, finally, I would like to point out some 
further historical and general ideas that may help us assessing Carnap’s 
inferentialism, and provide perhaps further discussion. 
Peregrin claimed (2014, pp. 27-28) that while Carnap accepted the usual 
empiricist dogma that the choice of conceptual frameworks or schemes is 
wholly conventional and arbitrary, and “the world can have its say only 
after we accomplish the choice,” Sellars and others “believed that the world 
influences our putting together the framework” (emphasis in the original). 
But that is something entirely accepted by Carnap! In his “Theoretical 
Questions and Practical Decisions,” published in the same year as Syntax, 
Carnap (1934c, p. 258) claimed that the world always has its say: while the 
development of linguistic frameworks, logical systems, and conceptual 
tools is a matter of convention, we are always restricted by already 
established empirical findings and by our wishes, aims, and goals pursued 
in a natural setting. In 1970, Carnap wrote the following to Gerhard Kroiss; 
it is worth quoting the letter at some length: 
The question how and where we should begin with the construction of our language 
and our system of concepts is indeed an important problem and a rather puzzling 
one. Wherever we might begin, we feel the need for a clarification of our initial 
concepts, and this a need to use other concepts which precede the “initial” concepts. 
This is the old puzzle of philosophy: how and where should we make the absolute 
beginning? 
I believe that the question in this form is unanswerable. It seems to me that the best 
description of the problem situation and of the required procedure was given by 
Neurath by his comparison with the task of repairing a ship. Our language, the 
whole conceptual system with which we wish to work, is like a ship on the open 
ocean; there is no dry-dock in which we could make a construction from an absolute 
beginning. We have only the ship itself, and we cannot proceed otherwise than to 
reconstruct parts while we are supported by the other parts. (Carnap to Gerhard 
Kroiss, February 5, 1970. RC 027-31-04. Typos corrected; pencil underlining by 
Carnap.) 
Carnap thought (together with Neurath) that the world always has its say; 
we cannot free ourselves entirely to find an abstract realm with free-floating 
conventions. Carnap embraced — as André Carus (2007) called it — a 
“dialectical picture”: setting up languages is a task for linguistic 
engineering and thus a practical task. How we set up our languages is based 
on how we set up our rules of formation and transformation. We may be 
                                                             
27 Though Carnap always referred to Tarski, the tripartite conception of pragmatics, 
semantics, and syntax, and the conceptual settings of his works connect Carnap mainly 
to Morris. Furthermore, there are some interesting differences between Tarski and 
Carnap on which see Wagner 2017. 
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motivated by theoretical virtues and facts of the matter, but these facts shall 
be captured already in a certain framework. So theories (i.e., knowledge and 
facts) influence our practices (building up languages), but our practices (e.g. 
our decisions) influence the theoretical level (since you can know only 
those things that can be expressed in a language). 
Peregrin (2014, p. 28) also says, that while for logical empiricists natural 
laws “must be simply empirical generalizations” and become like free-
floating conventions, “Sellars noticed that, as a matter of fact, natural laws 
do take part in conferring roles on the terms they involve and hence that 
they do constitute concepts” (emphasis in the original). Though Carnap 
(1937, §82) accepts that we deal with conventions here, he says that they 
are not arbitrary. “The choice of them is influenced, in the first place, by 
certain practical methodological considerations […],” but later “all must be 
tested by experience.” Of course, testing is not a unidirectional process, 
since after testing “P-rules [that is, natural laws] can be altered […], 
or the protocol-sentence can be taken as being non-valid; or again the L-
rules which have been used in the deduction can also be changed.” After all, 
for Carnap, the fact that “the hypotheses, in spite of their subordination to 
empirical control by means of the protocol-sentences, nevertheless contain 
a conventional element is due to the fact that the system of hypotheses is 
never univocally determined by empirical material, however rich it may 
be.” 
Thus it is not entirely correct to say, as Peregrin does, that Carnap did 
not consider empirical languages and expression in his Syntax-project. It is 
true, that he focused on logic and mathematics, but his P-rules, functioning 
as transformation rules, were just rules that determined the meaning 
and content of physical expressions via inferential patterns. Rules, rules, 
and rules: in the semantical writings, Carnap claimed that “rules determine 
the meaning or sense of the sentences” (1942, §7; emphases in the original). 
Whether to accept a rule or to construct a new one is a question of 
expedience, as was everything for Carnap, including semantics and syntax 
(in whichever sense). 
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